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[W]e must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omnis-
cient-that we are only 6 percent of the world's population-that we cannot im-
pose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind-that we cannot right every
wrong or reverse each adversity-and that therefore there cannot be an American
solution to every world problem.
- John F. Kennedy 1
PROLOGUE
The war on terrorism has dramatically impacted the direction of U.S. for-
eign policy, as well as the strategic and tactical operations for securing its objec-
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Program in Seattle, Washington (Nov. 16, 1961), reprinted in PuB. PAPERS 726 (1961).
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tives. Three questions central to U.S. foreign relations are whether these
interests are consistent with international law; whether the United States seeks to
modify international law to secure its interests; or whether foreign policy makers
see the need to significantly change international legal standards. The aftermath
of the of the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States triggered an
intuitive reaction that the normal rules of restraint embodied in international law
might no longer be relevant to the safety and vital security interests of the
United States. In short, the attacks of September 11 changed the international
law landscape in such a way as to make credible the claim that many of the rules
and institutions of international security are now obsolete. Some in the Bush
administration saw a way to co-opt international collective security institutions
to render them so weak that their prescriptive and operational force would sim-
ply become irrelevant.
The British government, however, sought to respond through international
institutions. According to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, countries could
respond to the threat of terrorism within the framework of international law,
particularly within the overarching structure of international security codified in
Article 51, the self-defense provision of the U.N. Charter.2 The Bush adminis-
tration followed the British lead and soon indicated that, indeed, international
law was not obsolete and that the United States could appropriately respond to
international terrorism within the general framework of U.N. Charter principles,
especially Article 51.
3
Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the United States needed
to identify the terrorists responsible for the attacks on New York and Washing-
2. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw spoke before the United Nations General Assembly
on November 11, 2001 to make the case for war against Afghanistan within the framework of Arti-
cle 51. He stated:
[W]e face a real and immediate danger. The murderous groups who plotted the terri-
ble events of September 11 could strike again at any time. And our first duty, to our
citizens and to each other, is to defend ourselves against that threat. When the nations
of the world agreed the UN Charter, they recognized the right of self-defence in
Article 51. It is in exercise of this right that the military coalition is now engaged in
action against AI-Qa'ida and the Taliban regime which harbours them. Taking mili-
tary action is always a tough decision. But here it truly was unavoidable...
Jack Straw, United Kingdom Member of Parliament and Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs, Address at the United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 1t, 2001), available at
http://www.ukun.org/articles.show.asp?SarticleType=17&ArticleID=346. Prior to this speech, the
United Kingdom reported its self-defense plans against Afghanistan to the United Nations Security
Council as required by Charter Article 51. See Letter dated 7 October from the Charg6 d'affaires of
the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/947
(2001).
3. Immediately after the attacks of September 11, Congress passed a joint resolution that
granted the President broad powers to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to combat the ter-
rorists responsible for the recent attacks. See P.L. 107-40, 2001 S. J. Res. 23 (Sept. 18, 2001)
(Authorization for the Use of Military Force). Soon thereafter, the United States also reported to the
U.N. Security Council its self-defense plans against Afghanistan as required by Charter Article 51.
See Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/
2001/946 (2001).
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ton. Next came the difficult task of determining what strategies were permissi-
ble to bring these terrorists to account. The U.S. government had long known
that the terrorists maintained a territorial presence in the Taliban-ruled Afghani-
stan.4 Intense public diplomacy followed on the issue of whether or not the
Taliban would cooperate in bringing the terrorist perpetrators to justice. Non-
cooperation by the Taliban regime implied an undesirable option: An invasion
of Afghanistan predicated on the principle that the regime collaborated with or
protected al Qaeda and sought to use Afghan sovereignty to do so. This com-
promised Afghanistan's sovereignty; it effectively became a terrorist state, or a
state within which terrorists had a disproportionate influence. The Taliban re-
gime transformed Afghanistan into what the United States defines as a "rogue
state," one that abuses its sovereignty. 5 The Taliban regime's inevitable non-
cooperation created for the United States the option of intervention, which
brought issues of the material and human costs of an actual invasion to the fore.6
Historically, the USSR, which had previously maintained a strong military pres-
ence in Afghanistan, became so mired in the then-existing civil war that the cost
of its presence significantly affected the stability of the Soviet regime. Would
the United States become mired in an endless conflict in the region? So far, the
answer is no.
The victory of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan suggested a signifi-
cantly changed picture of the region. The war cost little in terms of human and
material losses. Moreover, the strategic value of Afghanistan, with regard to the
projected oil pipeline from Russia to the Arabian Sea, indicated that the United
4. In 1999 and 2000 in two separate resolutions, the Security Council demanded that Afghan-
istan's de facto controlling power, the Taliban regime, turn over Osama bin Laden to a country in
which he was under indictment. See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999); see also S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 425 1st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (2000).
5. Afghanistan was among a series of countries designated by the State Department as being
of "particular concern" as state sponsors of terrorism or, in recent years, as "rogue states." Former
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. See 31 C.F.R. §596.201 (2000). The concept that a state
can somehow be a branded as an "outlaw" nation can be traced to the 1970s, and memorably to the
1980s when President Ronald Reagan called Libyan "Leader of the Revolution" Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi an "outlaw." See Robert S. Litwak, What's in a Name? The Changing Foreign Policy
Lexicon, 54 J. INT'L Aei. 375, 377 (2001). However, the phrase "rogue state" enjoyed more recent
popularity during the Clinton administration before the State Department officially replaced it with
the preferred phrase of "states of concern," the same words that now appear in the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998. See 22 U.S.C. 6401 et. seq. (2000) (enacted Oct. 27, 1998). For an
analysis of the International Religious Freedom Act, see Steven Wales, Remembering the Perse-
cuted: An Analysis of the International Religious Freedom Act, 24 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 579 (2002).
However, President George W. Bush resurrected the phrase, "rogue state" in Part V of the 2002
National Security Strategy of the United States of America entitled, "Prevent Our Enemies From
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends, with Weapons of Mass Destruction." See WrTE
HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13 (Sept. 17,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsclnss.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY].
6. For a discussion of post-September II defense funding increases, see Steven M. Kosiak,
Funding for Defense, Homeland Security, and Combating Terrorism Since 9/11: Where Has All the
Money Gone?, in SECURITY AFTER 9/11: STRATEGY CHOICES AND BUDGET TRADEOFFS 7-11 (2003),
available at http://www.cdi.org/mrp/security-after-91 1.pdf.
2004]
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States could maintain a strategic interest in the region with minimal political,
economic and humanitarian CoSt. 7 The Taliban regime had been a military pa-
per tiger after all.
Is the Bush administration's success breeding ambition and dimming its
clarity of vision, and if so, what are the implications for long-term domestic
security interests? This article seeks to advance the discussion of national secur-
ity in general, with specific regard to American foreign policy as outlined by
President George W. Bush. In particular, we undertake a detailed examination
of historically significant national security doctrines as well as the legal basis
underlying the 2003 American attack on Iraq in order to explore the Bush ad-
ministration's international policy determinations. Part I of this article discusses
the character of national security in the United States following its war on terror
in Afghanistan. Part II introduces threshold considerations as to how national
security doctrines are created. Part III then discusses the national security doc-
trines of a series of developing nations, or "lesser powers." Part IV proceeds to
discuss the national security doctrines of a series of developed nations, or the
"hegemons." Part V explores President George W. Bush's new national security
doctrine for the United States. Part VI scrutinizes the new Bush national secur-
ity doctrine by assessing the legal basis of the 2003 Iraq war, followed by Part
VII, which offers possible strategic justifications. In conclusion, Part VIII sug-
gests some implications of the Iraq war for the United States from a strategic
standpoint.
I.
NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER AFGHANISTAN
The war against the Taliban is not quite over.8 While there is still much to
do in Afghanistan, the war provided a needed justification for officials who have
long interpreted the U.N. Charter as a limited concept of self-defense to secure
legitimate U.S. security interests. The Afghan intervention also served as a pre-
cedent for a different principle: intervention into the sovereign internal affairs of
a state can be justified under the principle of defensive regime change. 9 Modem
7. The United States' presence in Iraq between 1990 and 1991 during the Persian Gulf War
caused the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to grow to approximately 600 million
barrels of oil. See ETHAN BARNABY KAPsTErN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 187 (1992). See generally Seth Stevenson, Pipe Dreams: The Origin of the
"Bombing-Afghanistan-for-Oil-Pipelines" Theory, SLATE MAGAZINE, Dec. 6, 2001, available at
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2059487 (stating that some journalists and analysts suggest that a key im-
petus for the United States' military campaign in Afghanistan was its covert plan to construct an oil
pipeline through the now relatively stable and "West-friendly" Afghanistan).
8. Tony Karon, The U.S. Says the Afghanistan War Is Over. The Taliban Aren't So Sure,
TIME ONLINE EDITION, May 6, 2003, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 0,8599,
449942,00.html?cnn=yes.
9. Michael McFaul, Since Sept. 1I, Nation-Building is Ascendant Again in the White House:
Dueling Ideologies Make Justifications for War Unclear, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2003,
available at http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/editorial/4983375.htm (stating that
"Sept. 11, 2001... compelled... the president to rethink basic assumptions about the world we live
in. Bush began, almost overnight, to believe that the United States had to go on the offensive and
remake the world into a safer place, a mission that sounded more like Wilson's and less like his
[Vol. 22:375
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international scholars must now grapple with two fundamental problems of in-
ternational constitutional law. The first touches on matters of security, self-de-
fense, and the strategic scope of defensive interventions to secure these claims if
they are authentic.' The second deals with the circumstances under which it is
permissible to enlarge or constrain the constitutional system of state
sovereigns. 11
The first problem of international constitutional law is that the stability of
the international system depends on the stability and security of the state. The
state, therefore, must be given a preferred position in the international constitu-
tional system.' 2  The circumstances under which external interference in a
state's internal affairs might occur must be limited and specifically defined. In
this sense, the U.N. Charter-with its endorsement of formal equality among
states-protects the domestic jurisdiction of states and prohibits aggression
against states large and small. 13 The most explicit indicators of this constitu-
tional principle are already in the U.N. Charter. The Charter also reflects that
the international order is not static, 14 so claims for self-determination and inde-
pendence are tantamount to claims to change the composition of the sovereign
entities in the international system. 15 Accordingly, the international constitu-
father's."). See generally Pierre-Richard Prosper, Reluctant Nation Building: Securing the Rule of
Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan: On Respect for the Rule of Law, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 433 (2002).
10.. See generally Oscar Schachter, State Succession-The Once and Future Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEM'ORARY READINGS 322 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 2nd
ed. 2003) (stating that self-defense can be clarified through lex specialis, but that the relationship
between national security and the Charter prohibition on the use of force is "inevitably complicated
and fluid").
11. The United States regularly promotes its domestic democracy by pursuing U.S. national
interests and defending American sovereignty. Jeremy Rabkin writes that "America's first duty
must be to protect is own democracy and the rights and resources of its own people-by safeguarding
its own sovereignty." JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 101 (1998). However, the
United States has consistently opposed any general rule permitting unilateral armed force to remove
threatening or unfriendly regimes. See Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search
for a Just International Law, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1999, at 2 (stating that during the Kosovo
crisis, it was proposed that the law should have been changed to allow NATO to act in place of the
United Nations Security Council; the United States showed no interest in this move and later did not
request authorization from NATO for the Iraqi invasion plan).
12. "A world where international obligations are kept within proper bounds may also be a
world that offers more encouragement for accountable government and individual rights." RABrIN,
supra note 11, at 101.
13. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2) (stating that "[the purpose of the U.N. is to] develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights... ); id. art. 2(1)
(stating that "[the U.N. is] based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all of its Members.");
see also id., Chapter II-Membership, Chapter VII-Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.
14. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 1934 App. Cas. 586, 594 (P.C.) (U.K.), reprinted in 3 BRIT.
Ir, r'L L. CASES 836, 839 (1965) (where the Privy Council states that i ntemational law is constantly
evolving because "[it] has not become a crystallized code... but is a living and expanding branch of
the law.").
15. The "purposes" of the U.N. Charter have been (and still are) determined by the continuing
evolution of intemational'law since 1945. With regard to the self-determination of peoples, it is
possible to apply the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") test in the Namibia opinion, in which it
referred to the developing concept of the "sacred trust" contained in Article 22 of the League Cove-
nant. The Court concluded that this "sacred trust" created the contemporary right of self-determina-
tion of peoples. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
2004]
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tional system, like all law, must clarify the circumstances under which it will
defend the status quo or instead allow lawful change.
The second problem of international constitutional law pertains to the per-
missibility of altering the constitutional system of state sovereigns. Prior to Oc-
tober 7, 2001-when the United States began bombing Afghanistan-the
invasion of Afghanistan staked a claim to more than mere self-defense. In gen-
eral terms, it was a claim to intervene and change a state's composition in the
international constitutional system. This claim required an expansive interpreta-
tion of the right to self-defense in situations where the enemy is not a state, but a
significant group of terrorists within a state. American officials and decision-
makers who sought to solve the Afghanistan problem inflated the principle of
self-defense so that international law would not be constrained by matters of
temporal limitation, such as the imminence of future attacks or the need for
immediacy required to repel an actual attack.' 6 The inevitable corollary envi-
sioned a regime change in Afghanistan to replace the Taliban, which was a sur-
rogate for terrorist interests. 17 This relies on a notion that conflates the Taliban
regime and the terrorists' interests, manifesting the concept of a "terrorist state"
with only a patina of legitimate sovereignty. Thus, the Afghanistan intervention
could be justified by the interesting principle that a regime sufficiently impli-
cated in terrorism, in the protection of terrorist operatives, and unrepentant about
the culture of terrorism within its borders may justify an invasion of the primary
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 ICJ REP. 16, 28-31 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia case] (upholding Namibian peo-
ple's right to self-determination under international law). Accordingly, international instruments
may be interpreted and applied within the framework of the legal system that exists at the time of
such interpretation and application, so long as the concepts in the instrument in question are inher-
ently evolutionary and that it was the intention of the parties to have them considered as such. Id. at
31. Much has been postulated over the last few hundred years with regard to the importance of self-
determination; the birth of the sovereign state gave rise to ideas about liberty and freedom. Christian
von Wolff, a philosopher and the author of a treatise on the law of nations, accepted the general
principles of self-determination and nonintervention. He saw a world of sovereign, autonomous
states that exist separately yet as equal parts of the whole global entity. See generally C. Wolff, Jus
Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
(J. Drake trans., 1934). Wolff wrote in 1749 that "[nlations are regarded as individual free persons
living in a state of nature." Id. at 9.
16. Some scholars argue that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not generally prohibit
force, but rather it prohibits force designed to compromise the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of another state. It also prohibits uses of force that are inconsistent with the purposes of
the U.N. Mary Ellen O'Connell recounts Professor Anthony D'Amato's position. See MARY ELLEN
O'CONNELL, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM: THE
MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2002),
available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (citing Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike
Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM J. INT'L L. 584 (1983)). According to O'Connell, D'Amato
interprets Article 2(4) to justify Israel's 1981 strike against the Osirik nuclear reactor in Iraq. Id.
Israel apparently sought to maintain its long-term security by preventing Iraq from developing nu-
clear weapons. Id. According to D'Amato, Israel's strike did not compromise Iraq's territorial in-
tegrity or political independence and it was consistent with the purposes of the U.N.; thus, it did not
violate the prohibition of force in Article 2(4). Id.
17. See generally AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MLIrANT ISLAM, OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN
CENTRAL ASIA (2000). For a brief summary of Afghan history from 1709 to the present, see the
chart From Empire to Revolt and Back: A Sampling of Afghanistan's Warriors, Kings and Dynas-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at B5.
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"terrorist state" by a primary "victim state" of terrorism.18 The specific purpose
of the Afghanistan intervention was to remove all of its "terrorist state" charac-
teristics and replace them with a new conception of statehood and sovereignty
more consistent with these themes as defined by the U.N. Charter.'
9
Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, violence, political and military consolida-
tion, and the threat of terrorism continue to pose grave problems. 20 The critical
question, or at least, the interesting focus of inquiry apart from regime change is
whether the strategic method of action and intervention is itself reconcilable
with international law. This formulation of the question might concede too
much, since it appears to defend the regime change principle under international
law. On the other hand, regime change is more than a claim; it is a fact.
2 1
Justifying the principle of regime change under international law is tricky be-
cause its relevance may be far-reaching. It is also technically and intellectually
interesting and represents an important challenge to the international rule of law.
If regime change in Afghanistan is consistent with international law might
there be other regime change targets of opportunity? Afghanistan made the re-
gime change concept an important element in the emerging national security
doctrine of President George W. Bush. The Bush administration apparently saw
the regime change principle as relevant to its future policy in Iraq. The envi-
sioned invasion would have to meet certain legal standards: it would have to be
both consistent with U.S. domestic law, particularly constitutional law, and justi-
fiable under international law. To effectively accomplish this, it must be justi-
fied by the new Bush Doctrine, the precepts of which must in turn be appraised
by both domestic and international legal standards. In the next part of this arti-
cle, we explore the relationship between national security doctrines and legal
culture. Ultimately, this article explores the ambitious invocation of the regime
replacement principle in the attack on Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
18. See Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another
Country, in Terrorism & Political Violence: Limits & Possibilities of Legal Control 243, 250 (Henry
H. Han ed., 1993).
19. State sovereignty is expressly protected by the U.N. Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1,
para. 2 (regarding the "equal rights and self-determination" of peoples); id. art. 55 (regarding the
"equal rights and self-determination" of peoples); id. art. 2, para. 7 (forbids the U.N. to "intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.").
20. See generally Karon, supra note 8.
21. Regime change is sometimes seen as a strategic objective of humanitarian interventions; it
comprises a claim to employ unilateral force that has apparently gained legitimacy since NATO
bombed Serbia and Kosovo in 1999 and the variety of commissions established to review the lawful-
ness of the action eventually concluded that it was illegal but given the circumstances, it was the
right thing to do. See generally HouSE OF COMMONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMIrTEE-FOURTH RE-
PORT, Kosovo (May 23, 2000), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm
199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2813.htm. Thus, the United States keeps some historical company with
regard to its regime change effort, which may be lawful under international law in the contextually
appropriate mechanisms to accomplish an inherently lawful act. id.
2004]
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II.
LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THRESHOLD CONSIDERATIONS
To better investigate the national security issue it would be useful to review
an important, often underappreciated aspect of international law: national secur-
ity doctrines. International relations experts carefully focus their concerns on
the problems of national security and often serve as advisors and operative play-
ers in the formulation of corresponding doctrines. However, the technical basis
of or justification for any national security doctrine should rest in part on inter-
national law and in part on municipal constitutional law.
The international law element of a national security doctrine is that it is
essentially a claim by a state that certain interests are vital to its survival and
security. In almost idiosyncratic manner, a state articulates these interests
through its national security doctrine to advise potential adversaries of what it
regards to be the limits of tolerable conduct, and signals that it is willing to
defend its interests by force if necessary.22 This means that all national security
doctrines contain at a minimum implicit claims that the doctrine is necessary for
the survival of the state and clarify the circumstances under which the state
might use its assets (such as the military, economic or diplomatic pressure, or
propaganda) to defend itself from external threats. The broad legal basis for the
defense of the state from external threats or aggression is the principle of self-
defense,23 codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and recognized as custom-
ary international law.
24
22. An historic international doctrine traced to Hugo Grotius articulates that a state may re-
spond to anticipated, as well as actual, harms under international law. "International law is not a
suicide pact"; it should allow for such unilateral measures when they become absolutely necessary to
protect the survival of a target state's population. See Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and
Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 31 (1994).
23. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter accords states an "inherent" right of self-defense in response
to the threat or use of force as manifested by an "armed attack." See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Intema-
tional law scholars continue to debate whether this right includes anticipatory or preventative strikes.
See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 272-78 (1963). The
international obligation to refrain from use or threatened use of force has been recognized as a rule
of customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 100. The ICJ has also narrowly construed "armed attack" to exclude
instances of a state's supply of weapons or training to non-state actors. Id. Accordingly, detractors
of anticipatory self-defense might argue that since the terrorists responsible for hijacking and crash-
ing the four US airplanes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania were not Afghan nationals, their support from the de facto rulers of Afghanistan did
violate Afghanistan's international legal obligations under principles of state responsibility, but it did
not create a right of self-defense for the United States. According to such scholars, absent a visibly
high level of state support of terrorism, an anticipatory or preventative strike would find dubious
justification under international law. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 72-74 (1993).
24. Some authors contend that self-defense exists as a peremptory norm because it meets the
"substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the
threat[s]... to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human values." See Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, pt. 2, Art. 40, para. 3, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCrION, TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES (2002). Implicit in the concept of self-defense is an urgent call to action to combat
[Vol. 22:375
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In municipal constitutional law, the question emerges more explicitly in
terms of internal actions a state might take to defend national security interests.
Broadly, the executive authority often seeks to circumvent domestic civil liber-
ties to more effectively defend the state. In some circumstances, this concept is
expressed through a "National Security State," which is ostensibly in a perma-
nent state of concern over threats to its own safety and security.
2 5
Any national security doctrine creates a classic problem for the rule of law
as claims based on national security typically tend to be impatient with legal
restraints. The principle of government under law often comes under pressure
as the need to protect vital security interests presents the expediency of naked
power. The danger posed by national security doctrines and the "National Se-
curity State" is, as Professor A.S. Matthews explains, that a temporary deroga-
tion from the rule of law has a tendency to become relatively permanent.
2 6
Threats based on terrorism, particularly when supported by weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), provide a powerful justification for the triumph of
national security power over the rule of law in constitutional and international
law terms.27 In other words, the classic problem presented by the claim to a
national security doctrine presents a critical question of whether power can in-
deed be constrained by law or whether such power is so critical to the survival
of the state that it cannot and must not be constrained by law.2 8
We might assume that matters of critical national security simply represent
the limits of law, so when we cross over onto the terrain of national security,
legal culture is abandoned.2 9 This approach suggests that the role for lawyers,
breaches of peremptory norms by dissenting states under the consensual framework of the interna-
tional system by imposing obligations on these states deemed fundamental by the international com-
munity. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Request
for Provisional Measures, 1984 ICJ REP. 196 (Order of May 10) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) ("These
fundamental rights of a State to live in peace, free of the threat or use of force ... are rights of every
State, erga omnes."). Accordingly, the right to self-defense is a "strong candidate for acceptance as
[a] peremptory [norm] of international law." Christine M. Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention Before
the International Court of Justice, 80 Am. J. ,rr'L. L. 495, 513 (1986).
25. See AREND & BECK, supra note 23, at 73.
26. See generally A.S. Mathews & R. C. Albino, The Permanence of the Temporary -An
Examination of the 90- and 180-Day Detention Laws, 83 S. AFR. L.J. 16, 37-38 (1966).
27. For an interesting explanation of the relationship between the rule of law and national
security, see Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARv. L. REv. 16 (2002). Judge Barak concludes that "Uludicial review of the legality of the war on
terrorism may make this war harder in the short term, but it also fortifies and strengthens the people
in the long term. The rule of law is a central element in national security." Id. at 158.
28. This contest between security and power is an historic one. In 1974, Chair of the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Senator Sam Ervin stated that "with power comes the ability
to do harm. The fundamentals of our constitutional system [and others] require us always to ensure
that governmental power is sufficiently constrained by law so that as much as is humanly possible
the power of government is used for good alone." STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTrru-
TIONAL RiGmms, COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 93d CONG., PREFACE TO FEDERAL DATA BASES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: A STUDY OF DATA SYSTEMS ON INDIVIDUALS MAINTAINED BY AGENCIES
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, at III (Comm. Print 1974). However, some scholars believe
that international law leaves open whatever international recourse is necessary to protect the survival
of a state's population. See, e.g., Beres supra note 22, at 31.
29. Some scholars argue that when matters of national security arise, international law regard-
ing the use of force, particularly in the U.N. Charter, ceases to be viable. Professors Franck, Comba-
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and the concept of legal accounting, must necessarily be limited.3 ° On the other
hand, we might view law as so critical to the values that make social organiza-
tion worth defending that we cannot assume an abdication of the role of law and
legal culture, even in the context of a strong claim to the use of power for na-
tional security. We would submit that lawyers in general are committed to a
principle of realism.31 This principle requires an abdication of the lawyer role
only in absolutely extreme circumstances. We submit that the operative pre-
sumption should be that the lawyer's role is even more critical in the context of
claims to national security because the stakes posed by the clash of law and
power are so high.
Lawyers and concerned policymakers might improve the quality of deci-
sion making if careful self-appraisal were directed at national security doctrines.
This approach would ensure that the invocation of the national security doc-
trines, as far as reason permits, would be consistent with the constitutional foun-
dations of the state, as well as those of the international system. One of the
central elements of the political theory and jurisprudence of the state is the as-
sumption that it does not exist to secure its own destruction.3 3 To service this
objective, every state has an implicit-or, indeed, explicit-national security
doctrine of some sort. It is possible, as the Romans saw it, that the safety of the
state is indeed the most important objective of politics and law.34
cau, and Glennon have reviewed states' continuing breach of Charter rules and deduce that the U.N.
Charter is no longer practicable and as a result, is generally ignored. See generally Thomas M.
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); Jean Combacau, The Exception of
Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9, 32
(1986) ("[lt]he international community no longer believes in the system of the Charter, because the
collective guarantee, in exchange for which its members had renounced their individual right to
resort to force, does not work .. "); Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 540-56
(2002) (suggesting that the U.N. has failed as a legal regime for regulating the use of force in the
international system); Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism; The Case for Anticipatory Self-
Defense, WKLY STANDARD, ]an. 28, 2002, at 24 (calling into question the viability of the Charter
rules on the use of force).
30. The normative aspect of the lawyer's role reflects upon the systems of cultural and profes-
sional identifications of lawyers. Professor Winston Nagan asks, "do they identify themselves as
bureaucrats, as champions, as acolytes, as 'friends' or are they influenced by the basic law models of
operational systems or the prescribed values of the UN Charter?" Winston Nagan, Lawyer Roles,
Identity, and Professional Responsibility in an Age of Globalism, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 131,
133 (2001). The U.N. Charter emphasizes values including world peace, security, human rights, and
development, which constitute the procedural and substantive foundations of the international rule of
law. Id. at 133. It might follow that the role of the international lawyer changes in times of national
security concern.
31. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNraMI, THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW &
LEGAL THEORY, AREA 5: INTERNATIONAL LAW xviii (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 1992) (suggesting that
lawyer realism is important and that the ongoing argument between realists and idealists is an unpro-
ductive intellectual "cul-de-sac").
32. The role of the international lawyer encompasses principles "built around several critical
'keynote' concepts which seek to secure peace, security, basic human rights and responsible eco-
social progress." Nagan supra note 30, at 153.
33. In other words, a state will not rationally be complicit in its own demise.
34. See generally LESTER L. FIELD, LIBERTY, DOMINION, AND THE Two SWORDS: ON THE
ORIGINS OF WESTERN POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1998).
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Neither the state nor the scope and content of national security concerns are
static matters. For example, technological advances at once enhance security
and insecurity. One state's security claim may be another state's concern for its
own vulnerability. More than that, one state's claim to security may pose a
threat to the security of the entire world community. Hence, the odd juxtaposi-
tion promoted by law is that both national security claims and collective security
claims are-on their face-valid. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 res-
urrected the problem of a superpower gravitating not only to a particular kind of
claim to national security, such as the informal declaration of an indefinite war
against global terrorism made by President Bush, but also of the construction of
a particular politico-juridical state for the future of the nation. In other words,
the claim implies a "national security" or "garrison" state of indefinite duration.
The claim implicit in the evolution of our current national security posture
seems to be in the direction of Lasswell's famous "garrison state" hypothesis. 35
The central question that vexed lawyers at the height of the Cold War was
how to secure civil liberties in a time of crisis over WMD. The internal legal
culture and the position they articulated under domestic law were subject to
pressures about the scope of executive power, with an emphasis on the needs of
and fidelity to the values of the American republic. Since a central value of
American law and politics is the idea of limited power, a claim promoting ex-
pansion or unlimited powers based on a national security crisis poses a serious
threat to the principle that official power must be subject to law.
The U.S. attack on Iraq notably required the articulation of a very carefully
structured national security doctrine. It required significant reevaluation of the
boundaries of self-defense in an age in which terrorists may have access to and
might be able to deploy WMD. Moreover, the question of regime replacement
in light of the abuse of sovereignty typical of the "rogue state" requires us to
carefully examine the notions of national sovereignty and the state in interna-
tional law as they are currently understood. Such an approach might deepen our
appreciation of the relationship between national security doctrines and actual
practice in international law. This perspective may help us appreciate the chal-
lenge the new Bush Doctrine poses for the rule of law and its legal currency in
the Iraq crisis. It should be noted that states large and small, particularly the
planet's hegemons, have some sort of national security doctrine, and, in different
ways, confront the problems of law and power.
3 6
35. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. Soc. 455 (1941), reprinted in
HAROLD D. LASSWELL ON POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 165 (Dwayne Marvick ed., 1977).
36. With regard to national security doctrines, most states have two priorities: "[o]n one hand,
protecting national security; on the other hand, protecting the dignity and freedom of every person."
Further Hearing 7048/97, Anon. v. Minister of Defense, 54(1) P.D. 721, 740 (Isr.). This is because
"there is no choice... in a democratic society seeking freedom and security but to create a balance
between freedom and dignity on one hand and security on the other. . .[to create a] bal-
ance.. .between the freedom and dignity of the individual and State and public security." Id. at 743;
see also Barak, supra note 27, at 155 ("[pjrotection of national security is a social interest that every
State strives to satisfy.").
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The challenges or responsibilities of the safety and security of the Ameri-
can people do come at a price. Law must pay for a part of the bill, but how
much? Perhaps the eighteenth century ghosts of Marbury and Madison will con-
tinue to haunt us in thought as well as in deed. States may think in very differ-
ent ways about how they might secure the survival of their vital interests. Some
states effectively see any threat to their survival as a threat to* the moral values
implicit in their organization; in these cases, defending the state might prove
difficult because these states' values may be threatened by an internal enemy.
What about the extra-territorial international law aspects of our problem?
Before we take a harder look at this issue, a comparative as well as a national
overview of previously employed national security doctrines might better
ground our discussion of how national security doctrines impact the rule of law.
III.
NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINES AND THE LESSER POWERS
Rather than begin this analysis with a review of national security doctrines
of great powers such as the United States or the Russian Republic, we first
embark on a perhaps counter-intuitive, but insightful analytical approach by
briefly assaying national security doctrines of smaller states and non-govern-
mental entities. This focus allows a greater appreciation of the ubiquitous
problems and issues tied to the legal regulation of national security interests.
The first example is Costa Rica. Costa Rica has a markedly different conception
of how it protects itself as a state as compared to other states. Rather than craft a
traditional national security doctrine, its security values are constructed around
the fact that it does not want a professional army, air force, or navy.37 The
implicit policy that sustains this judgment is the idea that the militarization of a
society constitutes a greater threat to state security than not investing vast re-
sources in military institutions. As a result, Costa Rica apparently relies on col-
lective (regional or national) security principles and concludes that joining the
arms race simply increases security threats. Thus, Costa Rica instead opts for
disarmament, peace, human rights, and the rule of law to enhance its own pros-
pects of peace and security.
3 8
The second example is a state with unique and exceptional qualities: the
Vatican. Quixotically, one is reminded of Stalin's comment about the Vatican
State's lack of a national security apparatus. The question he asked rhetorically
was, "How many divisions has the Pope?"' 39 The Pope maintains a small Swiss
Guard to maintain public order, but such a security concession appears to be
largely symbolic and ceremonial.4 ° Of course, the Vatican managed to survive
37. For a summary of Costa Rica's national security doctrine and its history of conflict preven-
tion, conflict resolution, and international relations, see Paul Wehr & Klaus Pfoser, Toward Common
Security in Central America, in CONFLICT RESEARCH CONSORTIUM (1990) (Working Paper 90-8),
available at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/full-text-search/AICRCDocs/90-8.htm.
38. Id.
39. George Weigel, The Pope's Divisions, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, Book World, at 1.
40. Milton Lipson, Private Security: A Retrospective, 498 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCi. 11, 13-14 (1988).
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without an army when Italy was a fascist state occupied by the Nazis, who were
generally unsympathetic to Catholic values. The Vatican's doctrines and prac-
tices during the war are still considered somewhat controversial, since ostensible
neutrality in the face of the Nazi scourge led the Vatican to remain silent regard-
ing the Christian values it championed. 4 1 However, such a position might have
been important to the Vatican's survival in other ways.42
Our third example comes from South Africa. Its approach to national se-
curity under the Nationalist Party was the crude "Total Onslaught" doctrine,
which was based on three principles: 1) communist aggression and subversion
was a major international threat to the South African state, 2) De swart gevaar
(the threat of black internal resistance), and 3) Kragdadigherd (the use of brute
force, both internally and externally to defend the state).4 3 Later, South Africa
refined these doctrines to position itself as an integral cog in the global defense
of "freedom" against communism. In effect, it sanctioned an unlimited "war"
against the opponents of apartheid, which involved interventions abroad, state
terrorism, and death squads at home. The international community subsequently
determined apartheid was a crime against humanity.44
Our fourth example, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY), had a formulated military doctrine. The SFRY contemplated the threat
posed by new Soviet policies (Perestroika and Glasnost) and feared the prospect
of the Federation's fragmentation. In response, it created the infamous "Opera-
tion Ramparts" doctrine, based ideologically on the equally infamous doctrine of
the Serbian Academy, the "Serbian Memorandum."'4 5 The memorandum pos-
ited the idea of a greater Serbia, and the security doctrine to secure it was "Oper-
ation Ramparts." The fundamental assumption made by the Serbian elite was
that if the SFRY could not avoid disintegration, the army (the JNA) would mili-
41. The Vatican expressed remorse for its inaction during World War H in a document entitled
We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah. Pope John Paul H asserted that the document "will
indeed help to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices." See Commission for
Religious Relations with the Jews, The Vatican, We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, Mar.
12, 1998, at 7; Anton La Guardia, Jews Scorn Pope's Apology, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 17, 1998, at
I (exploring the Vatican's We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah document).
42. In a private conversation with British Ambassador to the Vatican, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the
Vatican's Secretary of State under Pope Pius XI, Eugenio Pacelli (the future Pope Pius XII) ex-
pressed "disgust and abhorrence" of Hitler's reign of terror, but stated on August 11, 1933 that "[he]
had to choose between an agreement on their lines and the virtual elimination of the Catholic
Church..." Ivone Kirkpatrick (The Vatican) to Sir Robert Vansittart (Aug. 19, 1933) in Docu-
MENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 524 (1956); see also RALPH STEWART, POPE Pius XII AND THE
JEWS 17 (1999).
43. See House of Assembly Hansard, Mar. 21, 1980, Col. 3321 (remarks of P.W. Botha)
("South Africa finds itself the target of a three-pronged onslaught ... calculated to bring about the
downfall of this state ... The main object of the onslaught on the Republic of South Africa, under
the guidance of the planners in the Kremlin, is to overthrow this state and create chaos instead, so
that the Kremlin can establish its hegemony here.").
44. See Human Rights Watch, "Prohibited Persons": Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asy-
lum-Seekers, and Refugees in South Africa, at ch. III, 4. (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports98/sareport.
45. For a brief historical summary of events leading up to the drafting of the Serbian Memo-
randum, see Murat Somer, Cascades of Ethnic Polarization: Lessons from Yugoslavia, 573 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 127, 143 (2001). See generally VUK DRAsKovIc, KNiFE (2000).
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tarily conquer as much of the SFRY as could be absorbed into a greater Serbia.
The Serbs' ethnic cleansing policy led to the creation of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the principle of international military
intervention.4 6
Our fifth example centers on the conflict in the Middle East between the
State of Israel and the Palestinian people, and the various institutions that com-
pete for leadership among them. This conflict creates important insights into the
nature of national security doctrines as well as the problem it poses for the inter-
national rule of law. In situations of extreme conflict, state and non-state par-
ticipants are often fueled by informally constructed security doctrines generated
by elites or counter-elites. For instance, elements in the Likud Party maintain
that Israel cannot be made secure unless it has expanded secure boundaries that
include territories historically identified as Sumeria and Judea.47 Thus, the idea
exists that at the end of the day, Israel might only be secure if it can establish a
"Greater Israel." The doctrine-as advocated by these interests-is sometimes
supported by the idea that it is historically just to claim territories that were
originally part of the Hebrew heritage.4 8 The claim to security in these terms
would be incompatible with not only the original resolution for the partition of
Palestine, but other U.N. Resolutions which indicate that a final disposition of
territorial claims must be implemented according to law rather than the unilat-
eral claims to a zone of exclusive security. In short, such a claim would seri-
ously challenge important aspects of international law.
From the Palestinian perspective, Palestinian State rights can never be
achieved on the basis of a U.N. Resolution, which might be seen as dispossess-
ing Palestinians of their land, or the realism of Israel's national security claims,
which might involve the extinction of Palestinians' rights. These elements also
seem to see the future as requiring a "Greater Palestine" and an extinction of the
State of Israel. 49 These points of view do not represent the official positions of
either the government of Israel or what is left of the Palestine authority. But
there are powerful social forces at the controlling ends of both institutions that
vigorously assert these kinds of national security doctrines and therefore signifi-
cantly influence the prospects of peace under law. Moreover, the claims to the
46. See generally Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, Interna-
tional Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 127, 154 (1995).
47. Israel's right wing national party, Likud, has consistently encouraged settlement in Pales-
tinian occupied territories and plans on annexing the territories. Within the Israeli right there is the
secular nationalist wing, embodied in the Likud, and the radical right, spearheaded by the settlers of
the occupied territories. See Ehud Sprinzak, The Politics of Paralysis 1: Netanyahu's Safety Belt,
FOREIGN AFF., Jul. 1, 1998, at 18; see also Divide and Multiply, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1998, at
8.
48. See Sprinzak, supra note 47, at 18.
49. Some Palestinian authors argue that if Israel retains any measure of control or jurisdiction
over the Palestinian settlements in the event of a lasting Israel-Palestine accord, such control would
be tantamount to annexation and would in fact preempt the outcome of the final status negotiations.
They argue that the continued existence of Palestinian-controlled territory is contingent on the total
absence of Israeli control or involvement. See generally GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO Ac-
CORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000).
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integrity and security of the state and the claims for self-determination and inde-
pendence have generated strategic initiatives that, on their face, are violations of
international law. For example, the use of homicide bombers 'to attack Israeli
civilians seems to be a clear violation of various provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions. It remains unclear which forms of Israeli retaliation also meet the
standards of the Geneva Conventions and whether, in fact, the rules of belliger-
ent occupancy (which incorporate the Geneva Conventions) impose specific ob-
ligations on Israel.5 °
In truth, the claims to national security and patterns of retaliation and
counter-retaliation seem to gravitate to a position in which the rule of law is
seriously weakened. In the words of the poet Yeats, "the ceremony of inno-
cence is drowned.' What, however, is striking about the national security
claims within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the fact that each side
often sought to justify its position by bringing it closer to the national security
doctrines of the planet's hegemons, thus giving distinctively globad dimensions
to a regional conflict. 52 It may be that converting a regional conflict into a
global test of ideologies makes the conflict worse for the parties directly in-
volved in it. The Middle East is awash in conventional weaponry and, notwith-
standing the difficulty of finding WMD in Iraq, common sense requires us to
acknowledge the existence of some forms of such weapons or the capacity to
produce them.53 This acknowledgement presents a threat from state and non-
state actors alike.
50. Israel's position is that the fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable to the disputed
territories; specifically, Israel argues that:
The fourth Geneva Convention, where it applied-and to our knowledge it has never
formally been applied anywhere in the world-is intended for short-term military
occupation and is not relevant to the sui generis situation in this area. Moreover,
even were the laws of belligerent occupancy applicable, these rules, including the
1907 Hague Convention, contain no restriction on the freedom of persons to take up
residence in the areas involved.
Chaim Herzog, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations, Statement to the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/32/PV 47, para. 102 (Oct. 26, 1977).
51. WILLIAM B. YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE POEMS OF W. B. YEATS 187 (1983).
52. See ROBERT MANDEL, THE CHANGING FACE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS (1994); DANIEL J. KAUFMAN ET AL., A Conceptual Framework, in U.S. NATIONAL SECUR-
rrY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 3-26 (1985); MOSHE LISSAK, Civilian Components in the Na-
tional Security Doctrine, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 55 (1993). See
generally DAN HoRowrrz, The Israeli Concept of National Security, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND
DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 11 (1993).
53. Such common sense is supported by the recent location of small amounts of chemical
weapons in Iraq. See Liza Porteus, Tests Confirm Sarin in Iraqi Artillery Shell, FoxNEWS ONLINE,
May 19, 2004, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120268,00.html (reporting that a
155-millimeter binary chemical artillery shell that exploded in May 2004 contained three or four
liters of sarin, a deadly nerve agent, and that another artillery shell discovered in Iraq on May 2,
2004, contained mustard gas.); see also Associated Press, Iraq Sarin Find Worries U.S., CBS ON-
LINE, May 17, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/25/iraq/main560449.
shtml.
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IV.
NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINES AND THE HEGEMONS
Great powers or hegemons are the key formulators of national security doc-
trines. The global salience of their "claims" to spheres of security interests has
an influence on the conditions of world order, especially the system of power
and legal relations upon which it is based. At first blush, it may seem somewhat
oxymoronic to think about any national security doctrine as having to do with
rule of law. In general, the historic invocation of the necessity of national secur-
ity powers was meant to limit the role of law in the exercise of those powers.
Invocation of most national security competences insulates political decision-
makers from the restraints of conventional, constitutional, and even international
law. Thus, national security powers are ostensibly political and not legal.5 4
They are justified by the claims that the state's survival or critical interests can
only be secured by authorized political decision-makers who must be given the
degree of political discretion to make effective strategic and tactical choices
about the safety and security of the body politic. A viable national security
doctrine is not merely a strategic option for the United States, it is a strategic,
governmental imperative. American international lawyers might best deal with
the accompanying clash between international law and international power by
examining past American national security doctrines.
A. National Security and United States Executive Authority
Under the Oath of Office clause, the President, who exercises the constitu-
tionally prescribed executive competence of the state, is obliged to "defend" the
Constitution of the United States.55 Other officials may be required to support
the Constitution, but the President alone has the textual obligation to defend it.
This article is the prime source of the President's power over matters of national
security. The President does not have the power to declare war; that authority is
vested in the Congress.56 The President does, however, have the authority over
the conduct of war and armed conflict. Although limitations are imposed on this
power, its effect is vast and in the event a superpower President occupies the
White House, the fate of humanity rests in his control.
The effect of a greater state's hegemonic ambitions can be tempered by the
power-balancing effect of a lesser state's strong national security doctrine. In-
deed, a strong national security doctrine is also a core component of a lesser
state's realistic foreign policy decision-making. The proliferation of strong na-
tional security doctrines in states large and small may eventually establish a
54. For the leading study of the interplay between law and power in the context of world
politics, see generally Myres McDougall & Harold Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 A.J.I.L. 1 (1959). For an additional general analytical frame-
work of the relationship between international law and power, see MYRES S. McDoUGAL & HAROLD
D. LASSWELL, A JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, 375-
449 (1992).
55. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 7.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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common security, an emergent concept of international relations, which seeks to
interlink domestic national security doctrines with international human security.
In the United States, the President, his National Security Advisors, his in-
telligence advisors from the Pentagon and the CIA, and his political advisors
from the Department of State as well as his informal but influential ties and
connections to the private sector facilitate the formulation of the semi-official
national security doctrine of the nation. The doctrine was an especially impor-
tant part of the strategic positioning of the United States during the Cold War,
although prior to the Cold War, the United States did formulate doctrines that
incorporated national security values for the region. In searching for a rationale
for the public exercise of articulating and disseminating a national security doc-
trine for a particular administration, several target audiences are implicated
within the reach of the communication. These could be well known competitors
for power in the global arena. During the Cold War, the major competitor scru-
tinized in the name of U.S. national interests was the power with the capacity to
destroy the United States. That power was the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (USSR). It became important for the President to articulate as clearly as
possible how the United States perceived its vital interests and what it might do
to defend them.
Nevertheless, the power positions of both the United States and the USSR
maintained symmetry, as the USSR sought to articulate its own doctrines and
the scope of its vital interests. An assumption implicit in the invocation of most
national security competences is that the articulation of these doctrines lent a
degree of predictability as well as stability to relations between the two power
hegemons. But the question remains as to whether such doctrines have a juridi-
cal basis, and if not, should they? Further, if they should, what exactly is the
relationship between the law, the definition, and the expectations incorporated in
the assertion of national security interests via national security doctrines? To the
extent that law can have something to do with national security interests-the
most visible institutional and professional expression of which is found in the
ABA section on National Security-as well as the development of executive
instruments of self-limitation, congressional legislation, a potpourri of internal
administrative regulations and controls for intelligence agencies, and the devel-
opment of teaching materials and courses, we must assume that national security
is indeed subject to national security law. 57 The specific issue we want to ex-
amine is the extent to which the formulation of a national security doctrine (or
expectation) is an indication of a state's willingness to project power to defend
its certain interests. The critical question is whether the rule of law constrains
57. For examples of A.B.A. guidance regarding U.S. security issues, see Ambassador Miller
Provides Rules for Low Intensity Conflict, A.B.A. NAT'L SEcuRTY L. REP. 16 at 3, 7-8 (A.B.A.
Standing Comm. Law & Nat. Sec. 1994). See also National Security Law in a Changing World: The
Sixth Annual Review of the Field, A.B.A. NAT'L SECURITY L. REP. 20, no. 2 at 1-12 (A.B.A. Stand-
ing Comm. Law & Nat. Sec. 1998); Special Conference Issue: Nonproliferation of WMD Confer-
ence, A.B.A. NAT'L SECURITY L. REP. 16, no. 7-8 at 1-18 (A.B.A. Standing Comm. Law & Nat. Sec.
1994); The First (and Last?) Published Opinion of the Intelligence Court, A.B.A. INT. REP. 3, no. 12
at 3-4, 6-10 (A.B.A. Standing Comm. Law & Nat. Sec. 1981).
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the formulation, projection, or application of such power. This essentially
means that we confront the problem of national security powers in terms of legal
restraints, if any, on those powers; in short, we confront the clash of law and
power.
The practical Romans, although deeply committed to the culture of Roman
law, seemed to accept the principle that during war the law is silent. The Roman
maxim inter arma silent leges affirms this. 58 This spirit is reflected in a Presi-
dent whose power to conduct war is rooted in his constitutional authority. In
1998, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court William Rehnquist pro-
vided the Roman idea with a modern constitutional gloss. His view is that dur-
ing war, the government's authority to limit civil liberties is greater than such
power exercised in times of peace. 59 The Chief Justice believes that it is:
neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a
position in wartime as it does in peacetime, but it is ... likely that more attention
will be paid by the courts to the basis of the governments' claims of necessity as a
basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent during time of
war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.
6 0
A fair appraisal of the philosophy behind this conclusion may lead one to
believe that the fundamental assumption about the role of law and the role of
courts as protectors of civil liberties and human rights does not presumptively
kick in during a national security crisis, such as war. 6 1 On the other hand, this
statement may also be charitably viewed as not incorporating a complete abdica-
tion of the role of law in the management of national security powers in condi-
tions of crisis.
The object of this article is limited to national security law in the larger
global environment and an exploration of its precise impacts on international
legal order and international law. However, lines between what constitutes the
domestic, the municipal, and the national, as well as the global or the interna-
tional, are historically difficult to draw. 6 2 In the aftermath of the September 11
58. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218
(1998).
59. Chief Justice Rehnquist's wartime/peacetime dichotomy might not represent an evocative
empirical distinction. There may never again be another war officially declared by Congress, as
required by the Constitution. Of the more than two hundred active deployments of U.S. troops
abroad in the history of the United States, Congress has only declared five wars, none of which have
occurred since World War II. See THOMAS FRANCK & MICHAEL GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND NATIONAL SECURrrY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMULATIONS 649 (2nd ed. 1993).
60. See REHNQUIST, supra note 58, at 224-25.
61. Chief Justice of the Israel Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, wrote that "one must recognize
that the court will not solve the problem of terrorism. It is a problem to be addressed by the other
branches of government. The role of the court is to ensure the constitutionality and legality of the
fight against terrorism." See Chief Justice Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democ-
racy and the Fight Against Terrorism, Cambridge Lectures (Jul. 18, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.embassyoflsrae.dk/messageboard/TheRlefaSupremeCourtinaDemocracyandtheFight-
AgainstTerrorism.pdf). He went on to write that the Court "must ensure that the war against terror-
ism is conducted within the framework of the law and not outside it. This is the court's contribution
to the struggle of democracy to survive." Id.
62. "Globalization ... is a multifaceted concept encompassing a wide range of seemingly
disparate processes, activities, and conditions ... connected together by one common theme: what is
geographically meaningful now transcends national boundaries and is expanding to cover the entire
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attacks, Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept or Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the
"PATRIOT Act").6 3 Among the high visibility issues under this and other legis-
lation are the concerns regarding national security detentions of citizens and
non-citizens, national security trials, and the procedure of military tribunals.
64
These issues implicate both civil and political rights as well as international
obligations under human rights law and, in particular, they implicate the stan-
dards of the Geneva Conventions for the conduct of war and activities analogous
to war.6 5 The domestic lawyer must confront the effect of domestic legislation
that seeks to control and regulate international terrorism under the auspices of
U.S. domestic law, which is designed to have extra-territorial applications and
circumvent the scope of both civil and political rights, and the protections of
international humanitarian law. Congressional legislation and executive practice
and initiatives have thus vastly expanded the scope of national security law and
the challenge to the rule of law from both a domestic and an international point
of view.
planet. Globalization has led to an awareness that international issues, not just domestic ones, mat-
ter." Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 429
(1997); see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1- 2 (1993) ("'globalization'
refers to complex, dynamic legal and social processes. . .Today, the line between domestic and
international is largely illusory.").
63. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
64. After September 11, 2001, the FBI rounded up and arrested more than one thousand Mid-
dle-Eastern men in the United States. See Peter Grier, Which Civil Liberties-and Whose-Can be
Abridged to Create a Safer America?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/2001/1213/pls2-usju.htm. In October 2001, rules were created to suspend at-
torney-client confidentiality privileges for certain categories of this group of detainees. Id. These
rules are a part of a "multipiece package of legal changes which, taken together, represent a
profound increase in federal policing powers." Id. To justify these new policies, the Bush adminis-
tration reasoned, "[w]e're battling an enemy committed to an absolute unconditional destruction of
our society." Id. The Bush administration apparently believes that terrorists prefer to attack "ordi-
nary Americans, in their homes and places of work. That's a new threat, and guarding against it may
require a new kind of domestic police work." ld; see also Dante Chinni, Wide FBI Dragnet Turns
Up Leads, But Also Criticism, CHRISTIAN SC. MON., Oct. 15, 2001, at 2 (stating that
"[ijnvestigators' willingness to 'go out there and take in every single person that may have done
something wrong' is troubling, says a former senior FBI official. Civil rights violations are not his
only concern: several FBI agents working on the case have told him in the past week that the
investigation may lack focus ...[because] it is much more of a blanket approach than a laser
approach.").
65. Scholars debate about the extent to which the Patriot Act affects American citizens' civil
and political rights. Many authors are quite opposed to it. See Nancy Chang, How Does USA
Patriot Act Affect Bill of Rights?, 226 N.Y.L.J. 109, at 1 (2001) (arguing that the PATRIOT Act has
the "potential to diminish our privacy and political freedoms to an unprecedented degree by enhanc-
ing the executive's ability to conduct surveillance, placing new tools at the disposal of the prosecu-
tion, and granting the authority to detain immigrants suspected of terrorism for lengthy, and in some
cases indefinite, periods of time."). Others argue that infringing on civil and political rights is justi-
fiable in light of the importance of preventing future terrorist attacks. See William C. Banks & M. E.
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000)
(observing that "invasions of privacy [may be construed] as necessary evils in enforcing the criminal
laws ... [and in] seeking intelligence information.").
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B. National Security Challenges Faced by American International Lawyers
American lawyers who practice internationally confront a problem the mo-
ment they are conscious of the fact that they call themselves international law-
yers. If the scope and character of a national security doctrine purports to trump
law, these lawyers are not only irrelevant, but they become apologists for the
triumph of power over law. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist to some degree stops
short from that precise conclusion in the context of domestic law. This leaves
American international lawyers with a more difficult task. In order to stress the
idea that our constitution subjects a political authority to the restraints of law,
our lawyers must consistently appraise specific applications of national security
doctrines to ensure that they can be reconciled with international law. American
lawyers are acting from a powerful domestic need to ensure that the projection
of American power via a national security imperative can be rationalized as
falling within the outlines of the U.N. Charter. This can lead to fairly self-
serving constructions of what international law requires, but the central purpose
here is less to influence the international community than to defend the principle
that the U.S. government is not acting outside the law nationally or
internationally.6 6
The impression garnered by international lawyers outside of the United
States is that American international lawyers are driven by U.S. interests and
their constructions of international law are designed to serve narrow national
interest of the United States. 67 We suspect there is some truth in this position,
but we are inclined to think that American lawyers are basically conservative
and that they do not, under any circumstances, want to concede the principle that
the government itself is not subject to law. In this sense, American international
lawyers seek to preserve the rule of law even in national security conditions,
where considerations of crisis management loom large. It is also the case that
not many states articulate as explicitly their national security doctrines or inter-
ests upon a change of government, if they ever experience a change of govern-
66. The United States is party to various international conventions which articulate the signa-
tories' pledge to abide by international law. This pledge is perhaps best articulated by the Preamble
of the Charter of the United Nations, which states in part that signatories pledge "to establish condi-
tions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained, and ... to unite our strength to maintain international peace and
security, and ... to employ international machinery for the promotion of ... all peoples." U.N.
CHARTER, pmbl. The United States has been a signatory to the U.N. Charter since it entered into
force on October 24, 1945.
67. It is a widely held belief among non-U.S. lawyers and government officials that the United
States international or government lawyer serves the interests of "his supervisor in the department or
agency, the agency itself, the statutory mission of the agency, [and] the entire government of which
that agency is a part..." Note, Developments in the Law -Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profes-
sion, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1414 (1981); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers'
Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHi L. REv. 1293, 1298-99 (1987) (suggesting
that the duties of the executive branch attorney generally serve the interests of the executive branch);
Robert Lawry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong
Question, 37 FED. BAR J. 61, 62 (1978) (observing that rather than ask "who is the client?", the U.S.
government lawyer typically asks whose directions must be taken, whose confidences must be
respected, and exactly how does his or her role determine what course of action must be taken with
respect to everything else).
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ment. As a result, American lawyers and the legal culture they represent have
significantly enriched discussions concerning the classical problem of the con-
frontation between law and power in the international law context.
68
C. National Security Doctrines: Cold War to the Present
During the Cold War, the dominant doctrine of the United States was fed
by the principle that Soviet imperialism had to be contained. This was a cardi-
nal principle behind the so-called Truman Doctrine. 69 In the defense of this
doctrine, the United States was able to secure the support of the United Nations
and, although the United States led the military operations in Korea, it was in
effect a U.N. sanctioned operation. The intellectual roots of the Truman Doc-
trine were attributed to a famous article published anonymously by the diplomat,
scholar, and historian, George Kennan. 70 The doctrine was devised under the
assumption that the USSR was an imperialist, revolutionary state and that it
sought to subvert the international state system by supporting revolutionary ac-
tivities designed to secure regime change of a socialist character. The funda-
mental principle was therefore the doctrine of containment. 71  International
activity by the hegemons to either contain revolutionary nationalism or to ex-
pand it posed a powerful threat to the constitutional foundations of international
legal order based on the U.N. Charter. Scholars could conceptualize the prob-
lem of defining spheres of influence as an element of a national security doc-
trine, which essentially requires a weakening of the idea of sovereignty.
Another possibility might be the concept of permeable sovereignty; sovereignty
subject to superpower intervention as a disguised claim to change the constitu-
tional foundations of world order to account for the distribution of real power in
bi-polar terms.72 This clash of superpower spheres of interest and influence
68. "[International] law is neither a frozen cake of doctrine designed only to protect interests
in status quo, nor an artificial judicial proceeding, isolated from power processes ... [W]hen under-
stood with all its commitments and procedures, law offers.., a continuous formulation and reformu-
lation of policies and constitutes an integral part of the world power process." Myres McDougal,
Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 111 (1952).
69. Of the doctrine that bears his name, President Truman officially asserted, "I believe that it
must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who resist attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures." Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doc-
trine, Human Rights, and International Law, in Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MiGrr: INTE A-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 26 (2d ed. 1991). However, Truman articulated his personal
beliefs regarding war in his memoirs: "[t]here is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be
stopped by war. You don't 'prevent' anything by war except peace." HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS,
VOL. 11: YEARS OF TRIA. AND HOPE 383 (1956).
70. See The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947) (authored by George
Kennan during his tenure as Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department; scholars
widely believe the article represents an official policy statement of containment of Soviet power and
international communism).
71. Id.
72. In other words, by permeable, we mean that the major powers claimed a right to intervene
to secure and protect their virtual ideological, economic, military, and other interests. After the fall
of the USSR, post-Communist brushfires swept the globe and fresh governmental, social, and eco-
nomic powers rose in East Asia and the Middle East to challenge the United States. Author Samuel
Huntington asserts that no final victory for Western-style democracy and capitalism are possible
because of the emerging, unavoidable conflict between the great civilizations of the world, each with
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 22 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 395 2004
396 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
would deepen considerably as the development of nuclear weapons and sophisti-
cated methods of strategic deployment increased the stakes concerning the sur-
vival of civilization. This, of course, posed a vital threat to the constitutional
order of the U.N. Charter and how it would ultimately evolve as an instrument
of world order and progressive change.
When the USSR became a nuclear power, the assumption that it was an
imperialist state with nuclear weapons provoked a modified version of the Tru-
man Doctrine, the Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine of massive retaliation, or Mutu-
ally Assured Destruction (MAD).73 From a legal point of view, a doctrine
which seemed to shortchange the principle of necessity, undermine the principle
of proportionality, and completely ignore the principle of humanity raised the
question of whether technology had not itself superceded the international law
rules regulating the conduct of war.7 4 In effect, the international community
had to wait until 1996 for the International Court of Justice to provide a legal
clarification of the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used
and the scope of such use.
75
Recognizing that massive retaliation might overstate any security crisis and
elevate it to a direct, superpower conflict (specifically, the Cuban missile cri-
sis), 76 President Kennedy developed a nuanced version of the MAD doctrine.
This was the doctrine of "Flexible Response." 77 The Kennedy Doctrine of
"Flexible Response" led the United States into the Vietnam conflict and raised
important questions about the lawfulness of intervention in that country as well
as the conduct of the war itself. The CIA's policy of assassinating Viet Cong
fundamentally different views of man, society, and the state. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTING-
TON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 28 (1996).
73. The defense strategy of MAD evolved from the principle that neither the United States nor
its enemies would initiate a nuclear war because the opposing side would retaliate massively. See
generally H.W. BRANDS, JR., COLD WARRIORS: EISENHOWER'S GENERATION AND AMERICAN FOR-
EIGN POLICY 8-9 (1988).
74. Dulles is renowned for his risk-taking in Korea, Indochina, and the Formosa Straits con-
flicts, yet he was practical enough to refrain from painting the United States into a nuclear comer; in
the Southeast Asian crises of 1953, 1954, and 1955, he repeatedly declared that he had deterred the
Chinese from aggression by threatening them with punishing nuclear retaliation. id. at 9-20. Inter-
estingly, such risk-taking came to an abrupt halt in the Eisenhower Administration when it came to
preventative warfare. On the issue of preemption, President Eisenhower asserted, "[a] preventative
war, to my mind, is an impossibility .... I don't believe there is such a thing and frankly I wouldn't
even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing." JOHN F. STACKS,
ScoT-rn: JOHN B. RESTON AND TiH RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 133 (2003).
75. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 226,
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343 (1996).
76. Interestingly, President Kennedy also dismissed the notion of preventatively attacking Cu-
ban missile sites; Robert Kennedy called preemptive attacks "Pearl Harbor in reverse." See ARTHUR
SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES 508 (1978).
77. Under the Kennedy Administration's "Flexible Response" Doctrine, the United States mil-
itary discontinued its procurement of heavy missiles and instead concentrated on developing signifi-
cantly larger amounts of smaller missiles to better facilitate the complete elimination of enemy
forces. See SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE SALT II TREATY, S. EXEC.
Doc. No. 96-14, at 68-69, 167-73 (1979). For example, the government's shift in munitions prefer-
ence permitted the development of the Minuteman missile, a small, accurate, relatively inexpensive
and solid-fueled missile that the United States could produce in high numbers and which eliminated
the need for heavy payload missiles with counter-force capabilities. Id.
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leaders was an issue that focused on the role of intelligence and conduct during
armed conflict. It was claimed that some 20,000 Viet Cong leaders were assas-
sinated by CIA and allied operatives in the Phoenix Program.78 These issues led
to U.S. executive orders seeking to constrain the ability to assassinate foreign
leaders under the umbrella of national security imperatives.79
The Nixon administration sought to avoid the pitfalls of the Kennedy
"Flexible Response" and formulated a doctrine that assumed a certain symmetri-
cal disposition of power between the USSR and the United States. This led to
ditente between the United States and the USSR and, indirectly, the stability
thus strengthened the rule of law in some ways and weakened it in others. 80 To
this was added a kind of quasi-juridical recognition of the respective spheres of
hegemonic containment. This would result in rhetorical condemnation of super-
power interventions in their own spheres of influence but no prospect of direct
military confrontation. This doctrine did much to support superpower
interventions.
The Carter Doctrine endeavored to dramatically expand the role of law as a
stabilizing factor in the world community by seeking to provide solutions to
regional problems and vigorously expanding concern for human rights. A cen-
tral element of the Carter Doctrine was the idea that needless confrontations
with other hegemonic powers ought to be avoided; the consequences of a failure
to maintain stable expectations among super powers could, indeed, be cata-
strophic. The idea of minimizing conflict with the USSR-unless it was abso-
lutely required-was also a way of reinventing some of the basic constitutional
values of the U.N. Charter.
81
The Reagan Doctrine was a significant change from all previous doc-
trines.82 The Reagan policymakers believed that the USSR was, in fact, vulner-
able and could be militarily challenged in various parts of the world. The
78. See VICroR MARcHE-n & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
263-64 (1974); Jason Vest, Kill this Idea, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, May 7, 2001, at 2.
79. The executive order provides: "No person employed by or on behalf of the United States
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." Exec. Order No. 12,333,
§ 2.11, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (1981) (issued by President Reagan); see also Exec. Order No.
12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3,675 (1978) (issued by President Carter); Exec. Order No. 11,905, 42 Fed.
Reg. 7,707 (1976) (issued by President Ford).
80. For a general summary of the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine, including its intention to modern-
ize middle powers to enhance security against the Soviet Union and its subsequent toleration of
internal repression within these regimes, especially within the Shah's Iran, see ROBERT S. LITWAK,
DtTETrE AND THE NIXON DOCTRINE: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY,
1969-76 (1984).
81. The Carter Doctrine emerged in January 1980 as an apparently lawful exercise of the
critical zone practice. In response to aggression in Afghanistan on the part of the Soviet Union,
President Carter declared: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 197 (Jan. 23, 1980). The Carter Doctrine is not a disguised technique of intervention in
the internal affairs of states; it justifies itself in that it derives its lawfulness from its articulated
promised defense of governments from external aggression.
82. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles : The Reagan and Brezhnev
Doctrines in Contemporary International Law and Practice, 13 YALE INT'L L. J. 171 (1988).
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Reagan Doctrine was designed to move from containment, which was implicit in
previous doctrines, to encroachment, which effectively attempted to roll back
Soviet ideological and territorial influence. 83 The Reagan Doctrine was fueled
by his famous-or infamous-description of the "evil empire" associated with
Soviet hegemony. 84 Put simply, the theory was that the United States could
spend the USSR into bankruptcy in the arms race and, indeed, it succeeded in
doing so.85
The Reagan Doctrine also had immense effects on other countries and re-
gions, including a rapprochement-plus-constructive engagement approach to the
problems in South Africa, engaging the Ayatollah Khomeini with a bible and a
chocolate cake, 86 and involving members of the Reagan administration in the
Iran-Contra scandal. The encroachment inherent in the Reagan Doctrine was of
great interest to intemational lawyers because Nicaragua sued the United States
in the International Court of Justice and won. 8 7 The United States argued that
the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the case, and that, in any event, the issue
was a matter of national security and as a result, was not amenable to judicial
settlement. 88 It is possible to conclude that the Reagan Doctrine as applied to
Nicaragua failed the test of basic lawfulness under international law.
The other controversial aspect of the Reagan Doctrine was the formulation
of a policy of constructive engagement with the South African apartheid regime.
It is hardly likely that the Congress would have promulgated the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 198689 but for the vigorous and controversial promotion
of its endeavors to constructively engage racist South Africa as a part of the roll-
back of communism worldwide. The Reagan Doctrine therefore inadvertently
83. Scholars and officials Kirkpatrick and Gerson wrote that the Reagan Doctrine functioned
to restore self-government by subscribing to counter-intervention as opposed to intervention. See
Kirkpatrick and Gerson, supra note 69, at 31. These scholars and officials further wrote that Rea-
gan's was not a "roll-back" doctrine. Id. Based on the significant correlations between the Reagan
Doctrine and its roll-back practices, however, we must disagree.
84. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of
Evangelicals (Mar. 8, 1983), in PUB. PAPERS 359, 363 ("[w]hile they [in the Soviet Union] preach
the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual
domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modem world.").
85. Eventually, after Nikita Khrushchev's bold threat, "Whether you like it or not, history is
on our side. We will bury you," the arms race eventually ended with the "missile gap" favoring the
United States. See Remarks following the signing of a Moscow-Warsaw joint declaration in Mos-
cow, November 18, 1956, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1956, at 1; see also JAMES H. McBRIDE, THE TEST
BAN TREATY: MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, 13-21 (1967).
86. In 1985, just after President Reagan's re-election, his administration embarked on an im-
prudent scheme to sell thousands of missiles and spare parts to secure the freedom of a small number
of hostages from Iran, which was then ruled by the Ayatollah Khomeini. As part of the exchange,
then National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane and General Oliver North flew to Tehran bearing
a Bible and a chocolate cake as apparent signs of good faith. See Mark Tran, Iran After Khomeini:
White House Hopes for Better Times, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 5, 1989, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4613115-110875,00.html.
87. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4, 100.
88. See generally U.S. Department of State, Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Pro-
ceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, reprinted in 24 I.L.M 246
(1985) [hereafter ICJ Withdrawal Statement].
89. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
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brought the United States not only into full compliance with international law,
but made the United States an active promoter of change under international
law. 9
0
The lesson of the congressional regime change initiative (South Africa)
versus the Reagan Doctrine's effort at regime change (Nicaragua) indicates that
Congress' approach, notwithstanding an attempted veto by the Reagan adminis-
tration, was vastly more effective in promoting transition to democracy. The
Reagan administration's effort to promote violence in Nicaragua proved very
costly and provoked a constitutional crisis inside the United States. It should be
noted that in the context of intervention, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
was a remarkable acceptance of the principle that either South Africa was a
rogue state, or that its policies and practices of apartheid constituted an abuse of
sovereignty under international law, which made U.S. intervention by the sanc-
tions regime and its promotion of constructive initiatives of peaceful change a
remarkable stratagem of action in modem international law.9 1 Today, South
Africa is a liberal democracy.
During the Cold War, the USSR also formulated its own national security
doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine asserted the power to intervene in states
within the Soviet sphere of influence to protect international socialist gains.9 2
Both ditente and the Brezhnev Doctrine accepted forms of intervention into the
governance of nation states within the spheres of claimed hegemony. The fall of
the USSR made national security claims based on the hegemons of a bipolar
world seem obsolete. The new forms of conflict and threats to world order,
particularly the new ethnic conflict threats to world order, did not fit into the
existing definitions and perspectives of security specialists. When President
George H. W. Bush came to power in the late 1980s his administration was
confronted with a post-Cold War world, in which the United States was the only
superpower.
The first Bush Doctrine confronted certain ethnic conflicts and acts of ag-
gression, and in seeking the roll-back of Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, posi-
tioned U.S. national security policy within the framework of the U.N. Charter.
90. In 1985, President Reagan attempted to implement the Reagan Doctrine by invoking the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), [now available as 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1701-
1706 (1988)] as the authority for a range of sanctions against the government of South Africa. See
Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,535, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,325
(1985). For the implementing Treasury regulations, see 50 Fed. Reg. 41,682 (1985). Interestingly,
President Reagan's efforts were intended to forestall congressional action. See MICHAEL P. MAL-
LOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 447-48 (discussing sanctions under IEEPA and subse-
quent congressional legislation). President Reagan's effort was ultimately unsuccessful because in
1986, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 over the President's veto,
which brought the Reagan administration's policies under the umbrella of international law.
91. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
92. The Brezhnev Doctrine comprised the Soviet Union's official disposal of some fundamen-
tal provisions of the U.N. Charter; it proclaimed such U.N. Charter violations a "duty" in cases
where the "achievements of socialism" were threatened in any of the "fraternal countries." See
generally Richard Goodman, The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 1968, 4 Ir'L LAW 42 (1969);
Nicholas Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 209 (1980-1981).
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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was severely rebuked in international circles where
the U.N. Charter values, having survived the Cold War, were now under the
direct threat of unilateral repudiation. The invasion was a direct violation of
Article 2(4) and there was no pretense that Article 51 could cover the obvi-
ousness of the aggression.9 3 The great powers found the United Nations and
rediscovered the U.N. Charter. The defense of the Charter was, admittedly, sup-
ported by the threat Iraq posed to vital energy interests in the region; but multi-
lateralism became fashionable and the first President Bush saw an opportunity to
construct a different doctrine based on what he thought would be a kinder and
gentler world. However, the new world order rhetoric was short lived.
The non-ideological conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia,
and elsewhere weakened the enthusiasm for multilateralism, which rekindled the
latent U.S. interest in isolationism and stoked the general antipathy toward inter-
national responsibility. These forces have a long, dreary history of collectively
and successfully blocking U.S. ratification of the principal human rights cove-
nants. For example, they spearheaded the drive to prevent the United States
from paying financial dues owed to the United Nations, they insisted on re-
forming the United Nations, and the rhetoric of the right-wing in the Senate was
unrestrained to an extraordinary degree.94 The major casualty from such attacks
was the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 95 The Treaty was a vital
complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and sent an international signal that
the United States was not in favor of banning the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
As indicated earlier, most states have some sort of national security doc-
trine. The doctrine's ostensible rationale is to defend the state's national inter-
ests-or state's perceived national interests.96  National security in general
93. "President George Bush led the United States in the Gulf War coalition proclaiming, at the
war's end, a 'new world order under the rule of law.' The exemplary conduct of that coalition war
reinvigorated the Charter rules and the role of the Security Council." O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at
17.
94. For example, the Torture Convention was described by Senator Helms as "a skunk in a
bag." See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
101st Cong. 2 (1990) (statement of Senator Jesse Helms). Senator Rod Grams of Minnesota de-
scribed the International Criminal Court as a "monster" that had to be killed. See Jesse Helms, We
Must Slay This Monster: Voting Against the International Criminal Court Is Not Enough. The US
Should Try to Bring It Down, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 1998, at 18. Senator Gram wanted the U.S.
government to "make sure the treaty is never ratified by the sixty nations necessary for it to go into
force" and if the court should come into existence, against this out-and-out pressure by the United
States on other countries, Gram urged a "firm policy of total non-cooperation: no funding, no accept-
ance of its jurisdiction, no acknowledgment of its rulings, and absolutely no referral of cases by the
Security Council." Hearing on the Creation of an International Criminal Court Before the Subcom-
mittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Congress, at 3
(1998). Right-wing Senators have additionally talked openly about their inspiration, which they
garnered from the "defeat" of the League of Nations.
95. See Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, U.N. Doc A/Res/46/29 (1991).
96. A national security doctrine is a series of concepts with no precise, analytic meaning. See
generally Note, Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1972). "At its core [a national security doctrine] refers to the government's
capacity to defend itself from violent overthrow by domestic subversion or external aggression... it
also encompasses simply the ability of the government to function effectively so as to serve our
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targets the defense of basic values central to the integrity of the state. These
values include the integrity of territorial security, the security of the population,
security over basic resources, and defense of fundamental ideals. The strategies
of national security tend to target military sufficiency, diplomatic efficacy, eco-
nomic viability, as well as the management of the signs and symbols of commu-
nications propaganda. In international relations, the study of national security
has stressed the role of these values in the global balance of power, in collective
security, in the structural importance of federalist approaches to world order,
and the development of integrated functionalist approaches to the field.9 7 The
various doctrines would, in all probability, provide conceptual markers or guide-
lines to policymaking and might also be seen to trigger warning signs about the
outline of perceived security interests and the extent to which the state might go
to defend those interests.
V.
THE NEW BUSH DOCTRINE
9 8
When President George W. Bush came to power in 2000, his campaign
stressed that U.S. interests would be viewed with more isolationism than before,
with an inherent suspicion of multilateral ties, and with an even deeper suspicion
of both the U.N. Charter and international human rights. 99 This was not formu-
lated as a doctrine, unless one assumes that the reinvention of isolationism is
something novel in the American political landscape. The attacks of September
11 changed all of this. In the aftermath of the attacks, the outlines of a new
national security doctrine began to emerge from the post-Cold War world in
which the nature of perceived threats came from international terrorism directed
both at U.S. global interests and at the heartland of the United States itself.1°°
It would be useful to give a brief overview of national security doctrine
indicators in the current Bush administration prior to the events of September
11. First, there has always been a tendency to see the United States as having an
exceptional position within the international legal system. This exceptionalism
has often meant that the United States must carry a disproportionate burden
interests at home and abroad." Id. at 1133. Accordingly, "[vlirtually any government program, from
military procurement to highway construction and education, can be justified in part as protecting
the national security." Id.
97. Inis Claude, Jr., Theoretical Approaches to National Security and World Order, in NA-
TIONAL SECURrrY LAW 31, 36 (Moore et al. eds., 1990).
98. This section discusses the national security doctrine created by President George W. Bush
and members of his administration.
99. The Bush administration's battle cry apparently hearkened back to Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan's in the Reagan administration, "real men [do] not cite Grotius." DANIEL PATRICK MoY-
NIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 7 (1990).
100. See R.C. Longworth, 'Bush Doctrine' Arises From the Ashes of Sept. 11, CHt. TRIB., Mar.
7, 2002, at 4 (reporting that President Bush's post 9/11/01 foreign policy has become increasingly
unilateral and isolationist); Emily Eakin, All Roads Lead to D.C., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002 at 4,
(reporting the recent American scholastic development of branding the United States an "empire"
with imperialist tendencies); Fred Hiatt, Our Rose-Colored Cold War, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002,
at A19 (criticizing the similarity between the United States' recent foreign policy anti-terror ambi-
tions and twentieth-century Cold War-era policies).
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when crises of great magnitude affect the planet1l 1 In more crude formulation,
it is sometimes said that the United States is an important element in the process
of policing the global environment. The fact that the United States is the strong-
est military power on earth seems to heighten the expectation of its role in inter-
ventions. Paradoxically, it also heightens the expectation that it can act
unilaterally in these matters because it often pays the price for multilateral inep-
titude, which may increase the prospect of retaliation.102 U.S. exceptionalism
might be justified in different ways, including, but not exclusively, by U.S com-
mitment to democratic values and the rule of law, the U.S. track record of not
being an imperialist occupying power, and U.S economic power and military
dominance.
Prior to the election of President George W. Bush there were indications
that the grounds for American exceptionalism would serve as a justification for
U.S. unilateralism. American unilateralism carries a political constituency long
identified by the notion that U.S. exceptionalism justifies U.S. unilateralism.
U.S. unilateralism, in turn, has a constituency that supports U.S. isolationism.
Both isolationism and exceptionalism seem to be significant influences on the
emerging foreign relations doctrine of the Bush administration. Prior to Bush's
electoral "victory," he stated that the United States would retreat from its com-
mitment to promote development, which would, correspondingly, suspend pov-
erty alleviation around the world. In 1999, the Senatorial right-wing scored a
major defeat against the Clinton administration when it became jurisdictionally
seized of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and achieved its defeat.10 3 Al-
though there was little public outcry about this shortsighted act, the opportuni-
ties for controlling and regulating nuclear WMD were seriously
compromised. 0"
Moreover, as earlier indicated, the right-wing contingent in the Senate was
up in arms about the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
claiming that this treaty would compromise American sovereignty. So vehe-
ment was this antagonism to the ICC that many Senators suggested the United
Nations was a candidate for extinction, much like the ill-fated League of Na-
101. Author Richard Haass argues that "the United States [must] act, whenever possible with
others but alone if necessary and feasible, to shape the behavior and, in some cases, capabilities of
governments and other actors so that they are less likely or able to act aggressively either beyond
their borders or toward their own citizens and more likely to conduct trade and other economic
relations according to agreed norms and procedures." RICHARo HAAss, TIE RELUCTANT SHERIFF:
THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE COLD WAR, 4 (1997).
102. See JAMES C. HsiuJNG, IS SOVEREIGNTY STILL RELEVANT? ANARCHY AND ORDER: THE
INTERPLAY OF POLITIcs AND LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE
18 (1997) ("[i]n the anarchic system, a specific violation of international law by one country-if it
should stem from a unilateral action of self-help--is apt to invite reciprocal or competitive counter-
violations by opponent states"). See generally Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International
Agreements, I ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 75 (1998).
103. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Kills Test Ban Treaty in Crushing Loss for Clinton; Evokes Ver-
sailles Pact Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at Al (reporting the Senate's rejection of the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty).
104. Id.
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tions. 10 5 When President Bush came to power, he refused to sign the Kyoto
Protocol on Global Warming even though the Protocol was revised to accommo-
date all articulated U.S. concerns. ' 0 6 The Bush administration also developed a
profoundly negative approach to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,1 °7 the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty,'0 8 as well as the treaties governing biological
105. See Remarks by Senators Helms and Grams, supra note 94.
106. The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Dec.
10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.2, Dec. 10, 1997. For a summary of the Kyoto Protocol
and its implications, see Clare Breidenich, et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, 92 Am. J. INT'L L. 315 (1998). In March 2001, the Bush
administration announced that the United States would not seek to join the Kyoto Protocol to the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), May 9, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No.
102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 108, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). At the resumed Sixth Session
of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in July 2001 in Bonn, Germany, key compromises
were reached by developed states other than the United States on implementing the Kyoto Protocol.
See Note, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 132 (2001). Participating
states reached final agreement on the details for implementing the Kyoto Protocol at a meeting for
the Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties in Morocco in November 2001. See the Mar-
rakesh Accords and the Marrakesh Declaration (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://unfccc.int/cop7/
documents/accords.draft.pdf; see also Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Is Taking a Back Seat in Latest Talks
on Climate, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 29, 2001, at A5 (stating that the United States representative attended
this meeting but maintained that the U.S. rejection of the treaty was final).
107. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was
concluded in 1972. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, 944 U.N.T.S. 13; see also Note, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 910 (1999) (stating that Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty functioned to stem nuclear warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union,
so that "neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would initiate a nuclear attack if it were
unable to defend itself against the retaliation that almost certainly would ensue."). Each party under-
took not to deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems for the defense of the territory of its country,
not to provide a base for such defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for individual regions. Id.
In May 2001, President Bush withdrew the United States from the Treaty, stating that:
[W]e must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This
Treaty .... enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's
threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our
friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace .... When
ready, and working with Congress, we will deploy missile defenses to strengthen
global security and stability .... We are not presenting our friends and allies with
unilateral decisions already made. We look forward to hearing their views .... We'll
also need to reach out to other interested states, including China and Russia .... We
should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a [U.S.-Rus-
sia] relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability.
See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Defense University, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 685, 687-88 (May 1, 2001).
108. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has observed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and others like
it do not require the destruction of the United States' nuclear warheads. See Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Prepared Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the
Moscow Treaty (July 17, 2002), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02071802.htm.
Specifically, he has argued that "[t]his charge is based on a flawed premise - that irreversible reduc-
tions in nuclear weapons are possible. In point of fact, there is no such thing as an irreversible
reduction in nuclear weapons. The knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons exists . . . Every
reduction is reversible, given enough time and money." Id. President Bush was no more reassuring
than Secretary Rumsfeld in his response to a question as to why the United States still needed 1,700
nuclear warheads when he stated, "[y]ou know, friends really don't need weapons pointed at each
other.... But it's a realistic assessment of where we've been. And who knows what will happen 10
years from now? Who knows what future Presidents will say and how they react?" The President's
News Conference with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Moscow, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
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and chemical warfare. 109 The administration's policy on small arms and land
mines was particularly unpopular in international circles. 1" 0 Individuals wield-
ing small arms are responsible for almost 500,000 deaths each year."' John
Bolton, President Bush's Representative for Arms Control and Security, told the
United Nations that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected
an individuals' right to keep and bear arms; the United States, therefore, would
not support limiting trade in small arms or limiting civilian access to small
arms.
1 12
The attacks of September 11 provided fuel for those who feel that unilater-
alism is the only effective way to protect vital national security interests. This
has provoked a major discussion and significant conflict within the Bush admin-
istration. This conflict reflects the claim that there are few limits to the deploy-
ment and invocation of the use of force in the war against terrorism, as well as
Doc. 887, 889 (May 24, 2002). It would require incredible intellectual and linguistic dexterity to
reconcile this view with the disarmament obligation of the United States under Article VI of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
109. The Bush administration persists in chemical weapons research. The Department of De-
fense (DoD) argues that such research is necessary to protect soldiers against such chemical or
biological weapons use and the DoD research has produced two drugs that could potentially provide
soldiers with an internal defense against chemical and biological weapons, however, they are as yet
unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). See A STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, 103RD CONG, Is MILITARY RESEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS'
HEALTH?: LESSONS SPANNING HALF A CENTURY 21. (1994); see also Jill C. Keeler et al., Pyridos-
tigmine Used as a Nerve Agent Pretreatment Under Wartime Conditions, 266 J.A.M.A. 693, 693
(1991) (reporting on the pretreatment effects of pyridostigmine bromide for nerve agent exposure
during wartime). The DoD petitioned the FDA to waive the "informed consent" requirement, which
would allow the DoD to administer these two new drugs to U.S. troops without first obtaining their
informed consent. See Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics; Determination that In-
formed Consent is Not Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1991) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50). The
waiver was approved on a temporary basis, and permitted the DoD to issue pyridostigmine bromide
vaccine and anti-botulism vaccine to troops without obtaining their informed consent. See George J.
Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Guinea Pigs in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1991, at A21. Recently,
however, the Bush administration has acted on an initiative to eliminate some of the dangerous
chemicals in the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. Specifically, the Bush Administration
has ordered the Department of the Army to neutralize 1,269 tons of the United States' stockpile of
VX, an extremely deadly nerve agent. See Associated Press, Army To Destroy Deadly Nerve Gas,
CNN ONLINE (Jun. 9, 2004), available at http://www.cnn.com/20041US/Midwest/06/09/
nerve.gas.ap/index.html; see also Associated Press, Top Stories-VX, FoxNEWS ONLINE (Jan. 28,
2003), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,76872,00.html (reporting that VX agent
"is the deadliest nerve agent ever created" and that even trace amounts, as little as a "fraction of a
drop of VX when absorbed through the skin, can kill by severely disrupting the nervous system." It
is also reported that "Some experts and Iraqi defectors say that Saddam Hussein used VX against
Iranian forces in both the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the 1988 chemical attack on Iraqi Kurds in
Halabja.").
110. See Richard Falk, A Just Response, THE NATION, Oct. 8, 2001, at 2.
111. The Small Arms Survey, an independent research project at the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national Studies in Geneva, Switzerland is an important source of information regarding small arms.
In 2001, it conducted a survey that completed a study that implicated small arms in 1,300 deaths
each day. See Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem, available at http://
www.smallarmssurvey.orgfYearbook200l/Chapter_2.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
112. See John R. Bolton, Statement by United States Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security Affairs at U.N. Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All its Aspects (July 9, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/ sto-
ries/01070902.htm.
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the argument that to be effective in that war, much more than force is required-
and in any event, any effective war requires multilateralism and international
cooperation including an important role for the United Nations. When President
Bush spoke to the United Nations last year, he specifically stressed his adminis-
tration's impatience with the U.N. process and argued that the United States
reserved the right to unilaterally attack Iraq." t3 Those who follow the current
state of the debate face a radical polarization of both the American body politic
and the larger global community. To some, the war and its aftermath are disas-
ters; the strategic plan in the region lacks focus, consumes vast amounts of
money, and produces little in the way of an effective post-conflict scenario."1 4
President Bush, in a series of speeches, articulated the New Bush Doctrine for
the post-September 11 world. Although the volume of the document is modest,
it raises the question of how much unilateralism, cooperation, and central gui-
dance might be developed through the organs of national security, collective
security, and the United Nations. In this section of the article, we examine these
issues more carefully.
A. National Security Strategy: the Documents
The Bush Doctrine is the current national security strategy of the United
States. The primary document, essentially a collection of several speeches that
have been reorganized on thematic rather than chronological links, was released
by the executive. It provides an overview of U.S. international strategies: the
nation as a champion of human dignity, strengthening the alliance against terror,
and cooperation renewed by defusing regional conflict. Part V, entitled, "Pre-
vent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends, with
WMD,"' 1 5 is of particular concern because of its possible justification for a war
against Iraq. The other chapters stress the need to enhance global economic
growth by enhancing free market and free trade principles, expanding the reach
of development policies and tying these to democratic values, developing agen-
das for future corporate action, and a transformation of U.S. national security
institutions to meet challenges of the twenty-first century.' 
16
113. This is a pervasive sentiment among members of the Bush administration. For example,
shortly before President George W. Bush took office, Undersecretary of State John Bolton argued
that the United States had the right to act unilaterally to protect its sovereignty and reject multilater-
alism in its many forms. He wrote that "[i]f the American citadel can be breached, advocates of
binding international law will be well on the way toward the ultimate elimination of the 'nation
State."' John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from
America's Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 186, 193 (2000).
114. Florida Senator and former Presidential Candidate Bob Graham asserted that he "voted
against the resolution to go to war in Iraq ... because [he] thought it was the wrong war against the
wrong enemy, which represented the lesser threat to the people of the U.S .... [and he goes on to
remark that] [tioday, the question is ... how do we extricate ourselves from Iraq ...?" Senator Bob
Graham, Democratic Primary Debate, (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.issues2000.org/2004/
BobGrahamWar_+_Peace.htm.
115. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 13.
116. Id.
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Part V also focuses on what the Bush administration refers to as "Axis of
Evil" regimes because they possess or desire WMD. i t7 The administration's
approach was refined and expanded in December 2002 in a separate document
entitled "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," the de-
tails of which were delivered by President Bush at his 2002 West Point com-
mencement speech. 1 8  The West Point speech discussed the containment
doctrine ("MAD") and noted that since the collapse of the USSR, the global
security environment had changed."t 9 New threats to security interests were
those of rogue states and terrorists (apparently in that order). According to Pres-
ident Bush, "rogue states" are those that brutalize their own people, squander
national resources for personal gain, give no regard to international law, threaten
neighboring states, violate treaty obligations, acquire (or are determined to ac-
quire) WMD (or similar advanced technology), are aggressive, sponsor terror-
ism, reject human rights, hate the United States, and hate the values of the
United States.'
20
President Bush proposed a doctrine designed to meet these challenges, call-
ing for pro-active counter-proliferation efforts, such as detection, diffusion, and
the use of counterforce.1 2' He also proposed strengthening the efforts of non-
proliferation regimes. The intended consequences are effective management
and response to the effects of any use of WMD, whether by terrorists or rogue
states, and determination to "be prepared to respond" and "[not] let our enemies
strike first."'
122
During the Cold War, the threat to the United States was characterized by a
risk-averse enemy and the existing doctrine was one of containment and deter-
rence. Use of WMD was considered to be the last possible resort.' 2 3 Now,
WMD are the weapons of choice as tools of intimidation, blackmail, and aggres-
117. Id. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush identified Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea as terrorist states which, with "their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world." See Press Release, TeE WHrrE HOUSE, President Deliv-
ers State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ re-
leases/2002/02/20020129-11 .html. The United States has also identified Cuba, Libya, and Syria as
additional Axis members. See U.S. Expands "Axis of Evil, " BBC NEWS, May 6, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ americas/1971852.stm. The U.S. list of additional Axis members
noticeably excludes Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have been closely linked with
terrorist groups but all of which are additionally strategic U.S. allies. See generally Sean D. Mur-
phy, U.S. Judgments Against Terrorist States, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 134 (2001).
118. WHITrrE HousE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASs DESTRUCTION, (Dec.
2, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf; Presi-
dent Bush, Remarks at West Point Commencement (June 1, 2002), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
119. Id.
120. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 18.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 226,
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343 (1996) (separate Opinion by Judge Fleischhauer, at para. 5)
(stating that recourse to nuclear weapons "could remain a justified legal option in an extreme situa-
tion of individual or collective self-defense in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons is the last
resort against an attack with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or otherwise threatening
the very existence of the victimized State.").
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sion. Practicing containment and deterrence will not work on rogue states or on
non-risk-averse opponents. 124 Indeed, as in the case of al Qaeda, statelessness is
itself a weapon.
During his first term, President Bush has introduced a new category of self-
defense-preemptive self-defense-that he claims is legally justified in the new
post-September 11 world. President Bush first planted the seeds of the argu-
ment for pre-emptive self-defense in his address to the United Nations General
Assembly on Sept. 12, 2002, when he said, "The first time we may be com-
pletely certain [Saddam Hussein] has a - nuclear weapons is when, God forbids
[sic], he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to
prevent that day from coming."' 25 Five days later, he spelled out the case for
preemptive self-defense more fully and forcefully in his National Security Strat-
egy, now known as the "Bush Doctrine." Some excerpts from his National Se-
curity Strategy follow:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that pre-
sent an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces prepar-
ing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue States and terrorists do not seek to
attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead,
they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of WMD-weapons that can be
easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. The targets of
these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation
of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the
losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of
terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists ac-
quired and used WMD. The United States has long maintained the option of
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction- and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty re-
mains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such
hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemp-
tively. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging
threats... 126
124. The future of terrorist attacks will assume a massive scope as terrorists adopt the use of
biological and nuclear WMD to their strategy of "activated hatred." See generally PHILIP B. HEY-
MANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMON SENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(1998).
125. See President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New
York City, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1529, 1531-32 (Sept. 12, 2002); see also Legal Authority
for the Use of Force Against Iraq, 92 AM. Soc'Y INr'L L. PRoc. 137 (1998) (remarks of then-
Deputy Legal Adviser Michael J. Matheson).
126. NATIONAL SECURrrY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15 (emphasis added). The Bush adminis-
tration's apparent departure from Nixonesque realism-the supporters of which argue the United
States should not neglect its own interests in the service of others-and journey into the realm of
idealism-the supporters of which urge continued dedication to benevolence-with regard to the
interventionary and self-defense practices of the United States is somewhat reminiscent of the Wil-
sonian doctrine of global meliorism. After Woodrow Wilson's election in 1912, he strove to depict
the foreign policy of the United States as one guided both by its moral imperative that peoples
oppressed by foreign despots must be liberated and its lasting dedication to the continuing better-
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President Bush categorically asserted in his 2002 State of the Union Ad-
dress that "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dan-
gerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."',
27
These concepts were expanded upon in the September 2002 document, which
indicates that the new concept of deterrence is a fundamental change from the
past. According to President Bush, there are three principles of counter-prolifer-
ation: deterrence according to these new rules, defense, and mitigation.' 28 De-
fense and mitigation are activated when deterrence fails. The special threat
posed by WMD makes this exception reasonable, which activates three addi-
tional doctrinal steps: preemption, detection, and destruction of WMD before
they can be used.
129
The new Bush Doctrine is linked to a broadened concept of self-defense
based on threats posed by non-state terrorist groups and their rogue state spon-
sors. A central sanction built into the doctrine is the concept of regime replace-
ment. As we have seen, these ideas test the limits of permissible behaviors
based upon conventional international law doctrines. However, if state behavior
is significantly influenced by these principles, they may become more firmly
grounded as the new rules of the international legal system, even if vigorously
contested. The central point, however, is that if a regime is a candidate for
rogue state status and that regime is implicated in detectable weapons of mass
destruction development, that regime may be at risk. This means that the princi-
ment of humanity. See TiH RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 454-57 (Ruhl Bartlett ed., 4th ed.
1964). Wilson asserted, "[t]he world must be safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon
the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest,
no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we
shall freely make." ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY: A STUDY OF NATIONALIST EXPAN-
SIONISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 469 (1958) (quoting Woodrow Wilson). President George W. Bush
similarly asserted, "we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to
create a balance of power that favors human freedom ... We will defend the peace by fighting
terrorists and tyrants ... We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent." NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at iv. To similar extents, both presidents
articulated altruistic motives for their actions, and both had these motives called into question. See
GADDIS SMITH, THE LAST YEARS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 1945-1993, 27 (1994) (stating that
President Wilson "failed to convince many contemporaries and historians . . . that his ideals were not
a hypocritical cloak for traditional selfish purpose."); see also Karen DeYoung, Unwanted Debate
on Iraq-Al Qaeda Links Revived, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A19 (stating that Saddam Hus-
sein's ties to Al Qaeda are not substantiated by the evidence presented); Barbara Slavin & John
Diamond, Experts Skeptical Of Al-Qaeda-Iraq Tie, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2002, at 4 (stating that
American experts are critical of the evidence used by the Bush administration to possibly justify a
war with Iraq based on its ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network).
127. See State of the Union Address, supra note 117.
128. The Bush administration plans to be ready to respond to conventional and nuclear threats
with defense capabilities by bringing to bear effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and
domestic law enforcement to detect and deter any threat from the use of WMD. President Bush's
strategy blends a reliance on enhanced counterproliferation measures, increased nonproliferation ef-
forts to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond in the event that
WMD are deployed against the United States. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra
note 5.
129. Id. However, Henry Kissinger noted, "[i]t is not in the American national interest to estab-
lish preemption as a universal principle available to every nation." See Henry Kissinger, Our Inter-
vention in Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2002, at A15.
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pie of non-interference in the sovereignty of the state may indeed be more op-
tional than has been the case in the past as a practical reality.
B. The Libyan Example
This brings us to the recent development regarding Libya, the United
States, and the United Kingdom. According to reports in the media, Colonel
Qaddafi, the Libyan Head of State, has agreed to completely eliminate his pro-
gram for the development for WMDs and allow the United Nations as well as
the United States and the United Kingdom, complete access to its facilities.'
30
The timing of this public announcement might certainly be seen as a justification
for the far-reaching implications of the Bush Doctrine. It will be recalled that
among the shifting justifications for the war and replacement of the Baathist
regime in Iraq was the apparent reluctance of the Hussein regime to completely
divest itself of WMDs. The fact that evidence so far does not sustain this does
not make irrelevant the point that the United States and its allies will not hesitate
to use force if a rogue state develops WMDs because that rogue state may con-
stitute a threat to its vital security interests. The easy answer to the question of
whether the Bush Doctrine is the cause of the Libyan change in policy on WMD
is that it clearly has influenced Qaddafi's switch. The more interesting and com-
plex question is what other factors might have coalesced around the timing of
the Bush Doctrine to influence the decision. These other factors may indeed
compete with the currency of the Bush Doctrine in facilitating the Libyan deci-
sion. In short, there could be an ideological question about whether the Bush
Doctrine was a success in this matter or whether patient diplomacy over a long
period of time was the key to the Libyan decision.
Libya was severely punished by the sanctions imposed on it as a result of
the destruction of Pan Am 103.131 The investigation of this incident generated
evidence pointing ineluctably to the government of Libya.' 32 Libya's resistance
to international accountability weakened when South Africa became a leading
player in Africa and a new version of African unity implied an opportunity for
Libyan leadership in Africa. This, in effect, led to the informal South African
intervention by President Mandela and Dr. Jakes Gerwel. 133 Mandela was able
to persuade Libya that it was within its own interest to gravitate to a condition of
normalcy in the international system and to permit a Scottish court, sitting in
Holland, to try the Libyan defendants.1 34 Meanwhile, Libya's own economic
130. David Sanger, U.S. Lifts Bans on Libyan Trade, But Limits on Diplomacy Remain, N.Y.
TIMEs, APR. 23, 2004, at A4.
131. See ALLEN GERSON AND JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 274 (2001) (stating that
U.N. sanctions have cost Libya between $20 and $30 billion).
132. See generally Lorna Hughes, Libya: We're Guilty: Gaddafi to Admit Lockerbie Bombing;
He'll Claim He Didn't issue Order, SCOTTISH DAILY REc. & SUNDAY MAIL LTD., Sept. 22, 2002, at
8.
133. See Anthony Sampson, Mandela Says UK Must Drop Libya Sanctions, THE INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 9, 2001 (reporting that former South African President Nelson Mandela sent his representative,
Professor Jakes Gerwel, to communicate with General Qaddhafi in 1999).
134. See Allen Nacheman, Tripoli Distances Itself From Lockerbie Verdict as Libyan Con-
victed, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 31, 2001 (remarking on former South African President Nelson
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resources remained vastly underdeveloped because of the sanctions and the lack
of advantage from its African initiatives. It should be noted that the Treaty of
Pelindaba makes Africa a nuclear free zone.' 35 It should also be noted that
South Africa itself was the only nuclear power to voluntarily give up nuclear
weapons and allow full access to international inspectors. Mandela, therefore,
spoke with particular authority. The Libyans also perhaps felt is was in their
own self-interest to gravitate to a situation of international normalcy that might
also serve to remove the sanctions and permit freer trade with the more prosper-
ous parts of the world.
British diplomacy remained open to contact with Libya and after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks there was some urgency for Libya to distance itself from inter-
national terrorism. The Bush Doctrine added an important dimension to Libyan
decision-making.1 36 The idea that strong action would be taken against a state
with so called "rogue state" status and with an ongoing program developing
WMDs was itself a threat to Libyan sovereignty and independence. In short, the
action in Iraq and Afghanistan suggested as a practical matter, that sovereignty
is more permeable than in the past and that regime replacement may have an
operational reality. We may add to this the fact that Pakistan itself was already
beginning to disclose the recipients of its nuclear largesse.' 37 Thus, there are
several factors that conspired to make Libya accelerate the disclosure and inter-
national accountability for its WMD program. The example of the Libyan pol-
icy to relieve itself of WMD seems now to be influencing another rogue state:
North Korea.
The technical question that an international lawyer would have to confront
about national security doctrines is the claim that the sovereignty of certain
smaller states or powers is in fact permeable.' 38 In effect, if the United States
has a right to intervene in Santa Domingo,' 39 Panama,1 40 Granada, 4 ' Guate-
Mandela's role in assisting Libya to release the Lockerbie suspects for trial); see also Tortuous 10
Years to Bring Lockerbie Bombers to Trial, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 19, 1999 (noting that
former President Mandela's contact with Libya helped to persuade the Libyan government to release
the Lockerbie suspects to the U.N. Secretary General for prosecution in the Netherlands).
135. See African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, June 21-23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 698 (1996)
(this treaty is also widely referred to as the Treaty of Pelindaba).
136. See James Risen & Tim Weiner, C.LA. Is Said to Have Sought Help from Syria, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2001 (reporting that the Central Intelligence Agency opened lines of communication
with government and intelligence officials from a number of countries with historic ties to terrorism,
including Libya); see also Arshad Mohammed, Libya Extends Deadline on Ending U.S. Sanctions,
REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2004, available at http://news.findlaw.com/intemationals/20040420 /libyausadc.
html (detailing the progress made in United States/Libyan relations after September 1 th, 2001).
137. See Alison Caldwell, Atomic Energy Agency Concerned over Pakistan Nuclear Leaks,
ABC ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2004/sl03
9770.htm (reporting that Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf, discussed the fact that
Pakistani nuclear scientist, Doctor Abdul Qadeer Khan, passed on Pakistan's nuclear secrets to
Libya, North Korea and Iran throughout a period of ten years).
138. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 72, at 28.
139. The United States occupied Santa Domingo from 1916 to 1924. See generally BRUCE
CALDER, THE IMPACr OF INTERVENTION: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION
OF 1916-1924 (1984).
140. The United States intervened in Panama In 1989 to safeguard the lives of American na-
tionals in the country and to protect U.S. interests in the Panama Canal. See Marian Nash Leich,
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mala,' 4 2 Brazil,' 4 3 Venezuela, 144 South Africa, t45 the Congo,'4 6 Vietnam,' 4 7
Laos,148 Cambodia,1 49 The Dominican Republic' 50 and the Middle East, the
territorial integrity and political independence of a state is conditioned by factors
other than those envisioned in the U.N. Charter. Similarly, Soviet intervention
in Hungary,151 Czechoslovakia,' 52 Poland,153 or indirect intervention in Ethio-
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 84 AM J. INT'L L. 536,
545-49 (1990). The United States dislodged Manuel Noriega from power in the same year. See
generally Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International
Law, 84 AM J. INT'L L. 494 (1990). The United States previously assisted in the overthrow of the
elected President of Panama in 1941.
141. The United States intervened in Grenada in 1983. See J. Moore, Grenada and the Inter-
national Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984). See generally 0. Audcoud,
L'Intervention Americano-Caraibe a la Grenade, 29 ANN. FRANCAIS DE D. INT'L 217 (1983). The
United States allegedly intervened to safeguard the lives of American nationals; the intervention was
additionally legitimized by a government invitation and the authorization of a regional organization.
The practical effect of the intervention, and perhaps its underlying purpose, was to prevent Grenada
from falling to Communism. See The Situation in Granada, G.A. Res. 38n7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess.,
Supp. 47, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/38/L.8 & add.l, A/38/L.9 (Nov. 2, 1983) (condemning the unilateral
action undertaken by the United States).
142. The United States intervened in Guatemala throughout the middle of the 20th Century.
Indeed, the United States assisted in the overthrow of the elected President of Guatemala in 1954.
See generally PIERO GLEIJESES, SHATTERED HOPE: THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1944-1954 (1991).
143. The United States intervened in Brazil from 1962-1964, resulting in a military coup in
1964. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 33 (1996).
144. The United States has been accused of intervening in Venezuela to oust Venezuelan Presi-
dent Hugo Chavez on April 12, 2002. See Michael Shifter, Democracy in Venezuela, Unsettling as
Ever, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2002, at B2.
145. The United States lightly intervened in the South African power exchange after the fall of
apartheid in 1991. The South African example is "exceptional in that the parties completely renego-
tiated their political system with only a minimum of outside intervention." See WORDS OVER WAR:
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT 237 (Melanie Greenberg et al. eds.,
2000).
146. In 1964, the United States and Belgium cooperatively intervened in the Congo to safe-
guard the lives of foreign nationals during a heightened period of civil unrest. See S.C. Res. 199,
U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1189th mtg. at 328-29, U.N.Doc. S/6129 (1964) ("Reaffirming the sover-
eignty... of the Democratic Republic of the Congo " and calling for "states to refrain.., from
intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo, " but not demonstrating support for the cooperative
intervention). The 1962 Congo crisis instigated the Certain Expenses of the United Nations case,
which then expanded the security role of the United Nations. See generally Advisory Opinon, Cer-
tain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151 (July 20).
147. The United States intervened in Vietnam from 1965 until the cease-fire of January 1973.
See Daniel McIntosh, The U.S. Style of Intervention, in SUPERPOWERS AND REVOLUTION 51, 61-62
(Jonathan R. Adelman ed., 1986) (briefly discussing the United States' intervention in Vietnam).
148. The United States had continuing, clandestine operations in Laos for several decades dur-
ing the twentieth century. See generally JANE HAMILToN-MERRITT, TRAGIC MOUNrAINs: THE
-MONG, THE AMERICANS, AND THE SECRET WARS FOR LAOS, 1942-1992 (1993).
149. The United States backed a coup in Cambodia in 1970 to install pro-American General
Lon Nol. See THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY By CONGRESs 13-23
(1979) (briefly discussing the U.S. incursion into Cambodia).
150. The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965, supported by the OAS,
to safeguard the lives of U.S. and foreign nationals, as well as to halt a fomenting communist revolu-
tion. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 744, 745-46 (1965) (statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson of
May 2, 1965, explaining and offering justifications for the United States' unilateral intervention).
151. The Soviet Union occupied Hungary in the 1950's and imposed on it a treaty requiring
Hungary to allow Soviet troops to remain there. See Agreement on the Legal Status of the Soviet
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pia,154 Angola,' 55 and Latin America' 56 (including Cuba) suggest that the
power to intervene limits an individual state's territorial integrity or political
independence. We might say that claims for hegemonic power to intervene are,
in effect, a call to reinterpret the sovereignty provisions in the U.N. Charter to
conform to new world conditions, new weapons systems, and the overriding
concems that the superpowers need to intervene in their spheres of influence,
which must be tolerated because the greater good it secures prevents the world
from drifting toward Armageddon and merits its high price. On the other hand,
these claims could be characterized as violations of intemational law that re-
present a weakness in the international system and leave victims without an
international remedy. The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
States determined that the Reagan administration's attack in Nicaragua violated
international law and could not be justified by self-defense. It further required
the United States to pay damages to Nicaragua.' 57 In a repudiation of the rule
of law in this context, the Reagan administration refused to pay the bill and even
withdrew U.S. consent to jurisdiction from the International Court of Justice.' 5 8
Cold War military strategy did not rest exclusively on the vision of
MAD,' 59 but rather was based on an expanded version of the right of a state to
defend itself. Given the conditions of self-defense with WMD and advanced
systems for deploying them, such as nuclear submarines, these doctrines-even
Forces Temporarily Present on the Territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, May 27, 1957,
USSR-Hung, reprinted in Official Documents, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 215, 215-21 (1958).
152. The Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. See R. Mullerson, Intervention by
Invitation, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 128-29 (L. Damrosch & D.
Scheffer eds., 1991) (discussing the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan).
153. Nazi Germany collaborated with the Soviet Union by way of a nonaggression pact in
1939, after which the Reich attacked Poland and Danzig. See generally A. READ & D. FISHER, THE
DEADLY EMBRACE: HITLER, STALIN AND THE NAzI-SOvIET PACT (1988).
154. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1937. For an examination of the events leading up to the Italian
invasion of Ethiopia, see George Padmore, Abyssinia - The Last of Free Africa, CRISIS, May 1937, at
134.
155. During the 1960's and 1970's, the Soviet Union collaborated with Cuba to support insur-
gency movements in African countries, especially in Angola, to fight "imperialism and colonialism
anywhere in the world." See ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO: THE FULL STORY OF HIS RISE TO
POWER, His REGIME, HIS ALLIES, AND His ADVERSARIES 750 (1993). In response, the United States
indirectly offered military support for insurgency movements in Angola. See Stuart S. Malawer,
Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-87: The "Reagan Corollary" of International Law, 29
HARv. INT'L. L. J. 85, 93 (1988).
156. Amid the many interventions and assisted insurgencies in Latin America, perhaps Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's adherence to the Drago Principle, which prohibited armed intervention in
or occupation of American territories by European powers, left the most indelible impression on the
future of American foreign policy. Roosevelt's support of the Drago Principle led to the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which justified continuing U.S. intervention in Latin America.
See CLIFFORD DAMMERS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS AND RESCHEDULING, IN DE-
FAULT AND RESCHEDULING: CORPORATE AND SOVEREIGN BORROWERS 80 (David Suratgar ed., 1984).
157. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4.
158. See ICJ Withdrawal Statement, supra note 88.
159. Fear of nuclear destruction prevented military conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. The deterrence value of these weapons may have been a reason
why the International Court of Justice did not declare them illegal. See THE LAWS OF WAR: CON-
STRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 214, 217 (Michael Howard et. al. eds., 1994).
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when they provided restrictions on the sovereignty of some states-were criti-
cally important to define the appropriate sphere of self-defense utilizable by the
major powers. By defining that sphere, humanity potentially avoids the terrible
consequences of war between hegemons. Of course, if the superpowers did not
act to stabilize their expectations by intervention the only available option would
be direct confrontation, limited only by an official declaration of war.
Even interventionists have sought to constrain themselves and legitimize
their actions in ways that could make these acts more reconcilable with different
versions of international law and the appropriate rules and proscriptions. For
example, in Nicaragua, Reagan argued that the Contras represented a movement
of liberation asserting the right to self-determination. 160 The Brezhnev Doctrine
sought to rationalize the protection of socialist political order on the basis that it
was more representative of the right to self-determination.' 61  Thus, even if
these excuses are transparent in that they seek to limit the power of law, they
nonetheless also attempt to use the law to provide a degree of legitimacy. Even
at the height of the Cold War, the constraints of law were in the forefront of
asserted justifications to exercise certain powers of intervention. On the other
hand, the U.N. Charter stipulates that sovereign equality and independence do
not trump international obligations, which include issues relating to peace,
human rights, and the development of the rule of law.' 62 Both national security
and international law seek to limit sovereignty, but in different ways with differ-
ent objectives. The principle that sovereignty is not unlimited implies, at a mini-
mum, the existence of a legal expectation that sovereignty not be abused.
VI.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE IRAQ WAR
The technical justification under international law for the 2003 Iraq war is
that the 1991 Persian Gulf War had not yet ended, although some might see this
justification as weak and transparent. A condition for the formal ending of the
1991 war seems to be the complete disarmament of Iraq, with special regard to
160. See ICJ Withdrawal Statement, supra note 88.
161. See generally Reisman, supra note 82.
162. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obliga-
tions under the present Charter shall prevail." See U.N. CHARTER art. 103. The U.N. Charter is a
treaty within the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, so the principle pacta
sunt servanda applies. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 ("[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith."). This means that sovereign signatories-all 191 of them-though they are
sovereign and independent, must not limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the
Charter, nor override constitutional provisions, or undermine fundamental rights guaranteed by their
national constitutions or international human rights standards. See e.g., Civil Liberties Org. (in re
Nigerian Bar Ass'n) v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 101/93, para. 15, 1994-1995 Afr. Ann. Act. Rep., Annex
VI; Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 129/94, para. 12, 1995-1996 id., Annex VIII (re-
marking in its condemnation of ouster clauses in decrees transmitted by the Nigerian military gov-
ernment, that "Nigeria cannot negate the effects of its ratification of the [African] Charter through
domestic action. Nigeria remains under the obligation to guarantee the rights of Article 7 to all of its
citizens.").
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accounting for all WMD. However, reliance on Security Council resolutions is
controvertible and while mere semantic constructions and interpretations may
provide a patina of legitimacy, the legality of actions of this magnitude cannot
often stand on a weak imprimatur of legal validity. Critics want stronger legal
reasons to justify the expanded scope of Article 51.163 Valid security doctrines
may strengthen or weaken these claims.
The technical justifications for the attack on Iraq were based on Iraq's fail-
ure to honor its international obligations to disarm, including its pledge to divest
itself of WMD. The basis of the claim is as follows: the Security Council au-
thorized the use of force under Chapter VII to repel Iraq's aggression against
Kuwait."6 So long as Iraq did not comply with the U.N.-mandated condition
for a final peace settlement, the authorization for the further use of force contin-
ued, and Iraq-under the Hussein regime-still constituted a threat to interna-
tional peace and security. The asserted legal basis for the Bush administration's
invasion and regime replacement policy, without further Security Council au-
thorization, is based on preexisting Security Council resolutions. For the sake of
brevity, the relevant provisions and interpretive issues of the Security Council
resolutions are summarized as follows.
Resolution 678 authorized the use of "all necessary means to uphold" Se-
curity Council Resolution 660, as well as resolutions passed after 660.165 These
resolutions served to restore international peace and security in the Gulf. Reso-
lution 678 therefore served as the technical legal basis for the 1991 Persian Gulf
War. Resolution 687 stipulated a cease-fire, but imposed conditions relating to
the disarmament of Iraq, in particular conditions relating to the identification
and destruction of WMD. 1 66 Since the cease-fire was subject to certain dis-
armament conditions, including inspections conducted by the U.N., a material
breach of these cease-fire conditions terminated the grounds on which the cease-
fire was created under Resolution 687.167 The material breach provides a con-
163. The present approach to self-defense is that "Art. 51 clearly licenses at least one kind of
resort to force by an individual member State: namely, the use of armed force to repel an armed
attack." Bert V.A. Roling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 3 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
164. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the power to act. Article 39 of
this chapter grants the Security Council power to determine if a state's actions constitute a "threat to
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. If a state's actions threaten
to or breach the peace, or constitute an act of aggression, the Security Council decides what steps are
necessary to "restore international peace and security." Id. Among the actions it may authorize is
the use of force under Article 42. Id. art. 42. The Security Council can authorize various kinds of
force, such as employing U.N. troops (Blue Helmets) or empowering member states to act individu-
ally or collectively. Id.
165. See SC Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990),
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990) [hereinafter Resolution 678].
166. See SC Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991),
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution 687].
167. The United States' position is best articulated in the letter sent by the Permanent Represen-
tative of the United States of America to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council,
dated March 20, 2003:
The actions being taken are authorized under existing Council resolutions, including
its resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991). Resolution 687 (1991) imposed a series of
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tinuing justification for invocation of armed force against Iraq. The specific
interpretive issues involve the question of whether the words "all necessary
means"'168 found in Resolution 678 (1990) cover Resolution 687 (1991). It is
argued that since Resolution 678 was decided prior to 687, it cannot, without
more support, be read to cover the later Resolution 687.169 The critical para-
graph of Resolution 678 reads as follows:
[Resolution 678] Authorizes Member States cooperating with the government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in
paragraph 1.. .the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area. 170
The critical paragraph of Resolution 687 reads as follows:
[The final operative paragraph of resolution 687 reads that the Security Council]
Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be
obligations on Iraq, including, most importantly, extensive disarmament obligations,
that were conditions of the ceasefire established under it. It has been long recognized
and understood that a material breach of these obligations removes the basis of the
ceasefire and revives the authority to use force under resolution 678 (1990). This has
been the basis for coalition use of force in the past and has been accepted by the
Council, as evidenced, for example, by the Secretary-General's public announcement
in January 1993 following Iraq's material breach of resolution 687 (1991) that coali-
tion forces had received a mandate from the Council to use force according to resolu-
tion 678 (1990). [For the Secretary-Generals' public announcement, see Statement
Made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Paris (Jan. 14, 1993), re-
printed in IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HoSTILIrIEs AND THEIR AFrERMATH 741 (M. Wel-
ler ed., 1993).]
Iraq continues to be in material breach of its disarmament obligations under resolu-
tion 687 (1991), as the Council affirmed in its resolution 1441 (2002). Acting under
the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council unani-
mously decided that Iraq has been and remained in material breach of its obligations
and recalled its repeated warnings to Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a
result of its continued violations of its obligations. The resolution then provided Iraq
a "final opportunity" to comply, but stated specifically that violations by Iraq of its
obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) to present a currently accurate, full and
complete declaration of all aspects of its WMD programmes and to comply with and
cooperate fully in the implementation of the resolution would constitute a further
material breach. The Government of Iraq decided not to avail itself of its final oppor-
tunity under resolution 1441 (2002) and has clearly committed additional violations.
In view of Iraq's material breaches, the basis of the ceasefire has been removed and
use of force is authorized under resolution 678 (1990).
Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar.
21, 2003).
168. Specifically, in Resolution 678, the United Nations Security Council authorized states
even outside the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter (that is, member states cooperating with
the government of Kuwait) "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the
area." See Resolution 678, supra note 165, at para. 2.
169. For an additional synopsis of the legal basis for the Iraq War, see U.K. Attorney General
Lord Goldsmith's answer to a Parliamentary question regarding the legal basis for the use of force
against Iraq, UK: Legal Basis for War, CNN NEWS, Mar. 17, 2003, available at http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.uk.legal/. For Spain's position on the legal basis for
the use of force against Iraq, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.4721, at 15-16 (Mar. 19, 2003).
170. See Resolution 678, supra note 165, at 1565.
20041
HeinOnline  -- 22 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 415 2004
416 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and
security in the area.
1 7 1
It is possible to read these two resolutions together, but one is stretching
syntactic interpretation to secure authorization for the 2003 Gulf War from this
base of authority. Resolution 687 specifies in categorical terms that the Security
Council decided to remain seized of the events that led to the creation of Resolu-
tion 687. One can therefore read Resolution 687-by necessary implication-as
terminating the authorization of Resolution 678 because the matter was effec-
tively before the Security Council. If the Council is seized of the matter, so the
argument would go, it would be obliged to conclude whether a material breach
of the conditions of the cease-fire exists. If it found such a breach, the Council
would have to authorize the use of force. The critical resolution, in addition to
those already discussed, for justifying the 2003 Gulf War, is United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1441. According to Resolution 1441 (2002):
[The United Nations Security Council] Decides that Iraq has been and remains in
material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution
687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations
inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8
to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);
[The United Nations Security Council] Decides, while acknowledging paragraph
1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accord-
ingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to
full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution
687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;
Recalls... that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;
[The United Nations Security Council] Decides to remain seized of the matter.172
The phrase, "serious consequences" in Security Council Resolution 1441
did not textually authorize the use of force. 173 Indeed, the plausible construc-
tion of its language is that if the Council seriously contemplated the use of force,
it could have done so specifically, since the authorization of the use of force
comprises one of the major decisions that the Council can undertake. 174 Ac-
cordingly, the Council would not leave the question of the use of force to an
implication in textual language supplemented by tenuous strands drawn from
preceding resolutions. To some, therefore, an analytical interpretation of
whether the use of force in Iraq was authorized by the Security Council is an
argument that cannot be sustained on the basis of the language used in the rele-
vant texts and the interrelationships thereof.
175
171. See Resolution 687, supra note 166, at 854.
172. See U.N. SCOR Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002), at
para. 2, 13, 14 [hereinafter Resolution 1441].
173. Id. at para. 13.
174. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42.
175. For example, at a White House Press Briefing on March 13, 2003, former White House
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer asserted, "[tihe United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 au-
thorized use of all necessary means to uphold United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, and
subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." Press Secretary
Ari Fleischer, The White House, Press Briefing (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://
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Broader interpretive standards might justify the use of force under relevant
resolutions, but these justifications may sound highly technical and may not
carry a justification that clearly sustains the object and purpose of the interpreta-
tion. 176 Here, in effect, the concept of preemptive action seems not to be justifi-
able under United Nations Security Council resolutions and processes. The text
alone seems to provide no justification for the attack, and a purposive and teleo-
logical interpretation of the text would provide only weak legal support. 17 7 A
central element in the American and British claims, in contrast with those states
that favor the primacy of Security Council decision-making, is that the Ameri-
can and British perspectives undermine the institutional competence of the
United Nations, particularly the Security Council, by overriding the principle
that the Security Council has primary jurisdiction over matters of collective se-
curity. To assert security values outside the principle of institutionally regulated
collective action reverts to the almost completely decentralized authority mani-
fested by the League of Nations, which opened the door to unilateralism and
weakened the force of international peace keeping institutions. Unilateralism
may be a quick-fix solution that earns immediate popular approval, but it is no
substitute for sustained collaborative action in making lasting peace.
The United Nations is best suited for turning swords into ploughshares. In
the age of globalism and interdependence, its institutions of collective security
are absolutely indispensable to world order. Despite this institutional compe-
tence, it does not necessarily follow that a state may not take unilateral preemp-
tive action. New types of threats might require a more careful appraisal of the
primacy of the Security Council's institutional reach and the scope of certain
unilateral actions under color of Article 51 or self-defense under customary in-
ternational law. The central question is what institutional innovations within the
Council as a whole, particularly with regard to the P-5, might be developed to
respond effectively and collectively to new global security threats.
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/03/20030313-13.html. See generally Resolution 678,
supra note 165; Resolution 687, supra note 166. Some scholars have argued that the United States'
creation of a formal legal basis for the attack on Iraq by relying on Resolution 678 (1990), rather
than the later Resolution 687 (1991) is misleading, since Resolution 687 does not address WMD, it
only addresses Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
176. See Felicity Barringer, Critics Say U.S. Lacks Legal Basis for Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2003, at AI9; Keith B. Richburg, French See Iraq Crisis Imperiling Rule of Law, WASH. POST, Mar.
6, 2003, at A19; see also U.N. Doc. S/PV.4721, at 8 (Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Russian represen-
tative); U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726, at 28, 32 (Mar. 26, 2003) (statements of China and Syria).
177. Florida Senator Bob Graham remarked that the true purpose of the Iraq invasion cannot be
justified by the Bush administration's asserted legal basis. Rather, he concludes that the only viable
purpose of the invasion was to liberate the Iraqi people. Senator Graham stated that "we have a
chance to show the world that we were in fact in Iraq for the right reasons ... and we were there for
the purpose of liberating the Iraqi people ... not about the expansion of American power... not
about oil . . . We ought to lay this marker down." See Graham, supra note 114. Massachusetts
Senator Ted Kennedy also questioned the Bush administration's motives and legal basis for the
United States' invasion of Iraq. In an interview with the Associated Press in September 2003, Ken-
nedy declared, "There was no imminent threat [to justify the United States' invasion of Iraq]. This
[threat] was made up in Texas, announced in January to the Republican leadership that war was
going to take place and was going to be good politically. This whole thing was a fraud." Kennedy
Labels Iraq War a 'Fraud', WASHi. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003 [hereinafter Kennedy Remarks].
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The strongest credible reason for unilateral armed intervention by the
United States and the United Kingdom is to counter terrorism. Access to WMD
by terrorists constitutes such an important security threat that reasons exist be-
yond the letter of international law that must be canvassed in order to ultimately
determine the lawfulness of the U.S./U.K. position. 178 As earlier indicated,
whether one uses a textual or contextual method of construing these provisions,
the weight of interpretive logic does not support the construction given by either
the Bush administration or the Attorney General of the United Kingdom. Such a
construction must assure the perspective of a neutral third party. Because of the
nature of the international constitutional system, the power to interpret and de-
cide is vested in the Security Council. However, the Security Council cannot
repudiate the construction given to these provisions by the United States and the
United Kingdom; both nations have the power to prevent this from happen-
ing. 179 This effectively leaves the question of the lawfulness of the attack based
on a construction of these resolutions partly in the perspectives of the critical
state actors themselves, a model of the principle of international law-making
realism, which Georges Scelle called the dedoublement fonctionnel -the double
law-making character of a sovereign state as both a claimant and a decider of the
meaning, reach, and justification of an international law claim. 180
A reasonable claim of this character might strengthen the juridical basis of
a claim to lawfulness if the position is objectively compelling and gains wide-
spread acceptance. 181 In the context of high stakes issues, it might be that states
178. The evidence relating to WMD amassed by the British Government to justify the United
Kingdom's involvement in the 2003 Iraq War has been questioned. Prime Minister Tony Blair has
since been a focus of the Hutton inquiry, which was developed to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the death of the British weapons expert Dr. David Kelly, who was responsible for the
dossier to justify the British involvement in the war. See generally Lord Brian Hutton, Investigation
Into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly, Aug. 11, 2003, available at http://
www.the-hutton-inquiry.org. The Hutton Inquiry suggests that the evidence was inflated or "sexed
up." See Julia Day, Kelly Said Government Sexed Up Iraq Dossier, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Aug. 12,
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/ Story/0,2763,1017078, 00.html. Similarly, Presi-
dent Bush stated that the war against Iraq was mandated by the fact that it had WMD and was ready
to use them, yet after several months of searching, the American inspection team led by David Kaye
has been unable to find them. See generally Report: No WMD Found In Iraq, Sept. 25, 2003,
available at http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2003/09/25/iraq/main575078.shtml; Paul Reynolds,
Banned Weapons: Where Are They?, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ mid-
dle_east/ 2949441.stm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004); see also Associated Press, Top U.S. Commander
Surprised at Not Finding WMD, USA TODAY ONLINE, May 30, 2004, available at http://
www.usatoday.comnews/world/iraq/2003-05-30-iraq-wmdx.htm (reporting that Lt. Gen. James
Conway, the top commander of U.S. Marine forces in Iraq stated that he is surprised that searches
for WMD in Iraq have failed so far, despite the existence of American intelligence that indicated
such weapons were supplied to frontline Iraqi forces at the outbreak of the 2003 Iraq war. Specifi-
cally, Lt. Gen. Conway stated that "It was a surprise to [him] . . . that We have not uncovered
weapons ... in some of the forward dispersal sites." The Lt. General went on to say that "We've
been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but [the
WMD are] simply not there.").
179. U.N. CHARTER art. 24(2).
180. Georges Scelle, Le Phenomene Juridique du Dedoublement Fonctionnel, in REcHTPrAGEN
DER INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATION 324 (1956).
181. For example, in a departure from what has become the Bush administration's typically
unilateral international posture, Department of Defense officials feared the weakening POW regime
and urged President Bush to recognize the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the special
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are ill-advised to act in the international arena if the fundamental basis of their
actions rests on a highly technical legal justification that lends itself to other
permissible constructions which undermine it and, in any event, would require
more compelling justifications because the legal predicate, although plausible, is
a weak one. When a state goes to war with an utterly "formal" legal basis to
justify it, international public opinion' 82 and common morality will likely re-
quire its position to be supplemented with stronger, justifiable principles prior to
taking action. '
8 3
It is perhaps precisely with this consideration in mind that the United States
and the United Kingdom shifted their technical justifications for the invasion of
Iraq away from sole reliance on the prior relevant Security Council resolu-
tions. 184 If Saddam Hussein were, in fact, secretly developing nuclear, biologi-
cal, or chemical WMD, the possibility of a terrorist delivery system would pose
a future threat to the United States and the United Kingdom.' 85 In the aftermath
of the attacks of September 11, this is a strong and legitimate national security
and self-defense concern.' 86 It not only comprises a powerful justification, but
conditions in Afghanistan. See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led
Bush to Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
Shanker and Seelye additionally refer to the Department of State's support for applying international
conventions, a position that stems as much from concern over adverse precedent as from a bureau-
cratic design in favor of conformity to treaties. Id.
182. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain that in modern democra-
cies "even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of popular support. That support can
erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe
that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way." See THE LAWS OF WAR
xxiv (W. Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou eds., 1994).
183. The Bush administration was met with a marked degree of public outrage at the advent of
the United States' invasion of Iraq. See Patrick E. Tyler & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Most in U.S.
Support Delaying a War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A1; Michael Powell, Around Globe, Protest
Marches, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2003, at A19. However, public sentiment was sufficiently split so
that the Bush administration's highly technical legal basis was, for some, enough to justify the
invasion. See Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, More Americans Now Faulting U.N. on Iraq, Poll
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003; Dan Balz, War Support Widespread, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2003,
at A28; Diana Jean Schemo, Iraq Violates Rules of War, U.S. Complains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2003, at B6.
184. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 169.
185. Some government officials and scholars feel that the threat to the United States posed by
Saddam Hussein was best encapsulated by his attempt to assassinate Former President George Her-
bert Walker Bush. See Richard Bernstein, U.S. Presents Evidence to U.N. Justifying Its Missile
Attack on Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 28, 1993, at A7; see also Excerpts for U.N. Speech: The Case for
Clinton's Strike, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1993, at A7 (statement of Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. dele-
gate to United Nations).
186. Some point to Saddam Hussein's April 2003 pledge to award $25,000 to families of Pales-
tinian homicide bombers. See Mohammed Daraghmeh, Iraq Raises Suicide Bombers' Payments,
Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 4, 2002, at A20 (Saddam Hussein has pledged to pay $ 25,000 to the families of
suicide bombers). The Hussein pledge articulated for rewarding homicide bombers were strict; he
insisted that only individuals who blew themselves up with a belt laden with explosives would
receive the full amount; "payments [were to bel made on a strict scale, with different amounts for
wounds, disablement, death as a 'martyr' and $25,000 for a suicide bomber." President George W.
Bush, Saddam Hussein's Support for International Terrorism, The White House, Nov. 4, 2002,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regionallnealiraq/text/0912wthsbkgd.htm. Additionally, some
rely on information gleaned from former Iraqi military officers, who have described highly secret
training facilities in Iraq where Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs were trained in plane and train hijacking,
sabotage, assassinations, and explosives. See id.
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also strengthens the weight given to the technical construction of the relevant
Security Council resolutions. It may be that the United States and the United
Kingdom understood this and made the issue of WMD a major part of the justi-
fication for the attack on Iraq. This, in turn, generated national and international
concerns about the reliability and interpretations of intelligence regarding
WMD.
18 7
Certainly, WMD coupled with the threat of an apocalyptic form of terror-
ism provided compelling justifications to take the kind of action the states saw
as permissible and lawful, but we must enter this analysis cautiously. Threats
alone may not justify the specific strategic form of intervention undertaken. In
short, even if Saddam Hussein's alleged WMD posed a threat to the security of
the United States and the United Kingdom, it is not certain that an armed attack
was the most reasonable defense of the American and British national security
interests, or that such attack could not have been effectively pursued in the Se-
curity Council.188 The American and British claims become particularly vulner-
able in light of a more critical examination of the principle of self-defense under
international law. It is precisely in this area where the Bush Doctrine is most
challenging. The Bush Doctrine recognizes that the proliferation of WMD dur-
ing the Cold War could be limited by policies that might rationally influence an
adversary. The American adversary during the Cold War was one committed to
a balance of global power and committed to a rational policy of being risk-
averse. 189 In this context, deterrence stabilized international security and per-
mitted international cooperation in areas of arms control and non-proliferation.
However, the days of the Cold War-when WMD were generally regarded as
weapons of last resort-are over.1 90 Contemporary security theorists surmise
that the enemies of the West now view WMD as an effective instrument of
destruction.' 9 ' Within this context, the concept of deterrence as conventionally
understood is weak if not obsolete. According to President Bush:
187. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the "lion of liberalism," often points to former British Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook's infamous March 2003 indictment of the entire Iraq war when he asserted,
"instead of using intelligence as evidence on which to base a decision about policy, we used intelli-
gence as the basis on which to justify a policy on which we had already settled." See Arthur Schles-
inger Jr., The Imperial Presidency Redux, Wash. Post., June 28, 2003, at A25 (quoting Cook and
stating that he "formulated the charge [against the war] with precision."); see also Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr., Eyeless in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 23, 2003, at 26 (again quoting Secretary
Cook and stating that "we note now.., the greedy zeal with which Bush and his allies seized upon
crumbs of intelligence.").
188. Recall that former President George H. W. Bush's use of military force in the Persian Gulf
War was guided by limitations in the 1991 Iraq Resolution. See Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (outlining the restrictions on
use of military force). According to the Iraq Resolution, the President was required to prove to
Congress that all diplomatic avenues for resolving the conflict were exhausted before war before
fighting began and that the scope of military activity was limited to achieving the goals set out by
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677,
and 678. Id.
189. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 226,
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343 (1996) (separate Opinion by Judge Fleischhauer, at para. 5).
190. Id.
191. See HEYMANN, supra note 124.
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[t]raditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-
called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is state-
lessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue
WMD compels us to action.1
92
We contend that the new Bush Doctrine makes a narrow but reasonable
claim that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter-relating to self-defense-simply can-
not be read literally. Article 51 provides a state with a right of self-defense in
international law, "if an armed attack occurs." The Bush Doctrine explicitly
claims that a state may lawfully take action to defend itself if there is an immi-
nent danger of attack; the Bush administration holds that anticipatory self-de-
fense is conditioned by the factual imminence of an attack. 193 As a technical
matter of interpretation, if this broader construction of Article 51 is accepted, it
must also have a technical justification to validate the form of such an
interpretation. '
9 4
Two principle justifications may, in theory, be presented to support the new
Bush Doctrine of preemption. First, one must assume that self-defense in inter-
national law holds its place of prominence in the U.N. Charter and in customary
international law, because of the importance of the term "self."' 195 This effectu-
ally means that even though institutions of collective security for collective ac-
tion are currently highly developed, when viewed from a historical perspective,
a significant element of security management must ultimately be left to the prin-
ciple of the "self' included in the concept of international self-defense. Not-
withstanding the constitutional development of efforts to institutionalize
collective security through the Security Council and through regional security
associations, it is still the case that an important competence over national secur-
ity lies with the individual nation state. If this assumption is correct, then the
critical question is whether there are standards that might guide a rational invo-
cation of the right to self-defense if the conditions in a given situation make
preemptive action reasonable. This leads us to the second element of justifica-
tion. If we accept the fact that the word "self' in "self-defense" simply recog-
nizes important imperfections in the system of collective security, then the
structure of a state's claim to self-defense comes close to the principle of the
dedoublement fonctionnel.19 6 The state is a claimant, claiming the right to pre-
emptive self-defense. Since the state may have acted on that claim, the state has
an international obligation to justify it as an exercise of a national security com-
petence that is reasonable within the framework of the major purposes and poli-
192. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15.
193. Id.
194. See WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 7, 95, 226 (1999)
(discussing the U.S. military's definitions of hostile intent and hostile act and arguing that at some
point a threat to use force that is short of actual use can demonstrate hostile intent and trigger a
nation's right to anticipatory self-defense).
195. See generally Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53
U. CHI L. REV. 113 (1986); Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations among States,
1985-86 AM. BRANCH INT'L. L. Ass'N, PROC. & COMM. REPS. 188, 201-10.
196. See generally Scelle, supra note 180.
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cies of the international constitutional system. This principle was well
expressed by Professor H.A. Smith, writing in another context:
The law of nations, which is neither enacted nor interpreted by any visible author-
ity universally recognized, professes to be the application of reason to interna-
tional conduct. From this it follows that any claim which is admittedly reasonable
may fairly be presumed to be in accord with law, and the burden of proving that it
is contrary to the law should lie on the State which opposes the claim.
What the doctrine seeks to do, however, in light of the September 11 at-
tacks, is to suggest that states "must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."' 98 Since terrorists and rogue
states seek to use unconventional means to attack the security of their perceived
adversaries, 199 they will seek to inflict the highest amount of damage upon their
victim states by operating covertly and potentially unleashing WMD on innocent
civilian populations without warning. 2°
In the war against terrorism, the Bush Doctrine unambiguously states that
the United States reserves the option to use force in preemptive action to protect
its national security. According to President Bush, "[tihe greater the threat, the
greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy's attack. '20 1 The Bush Doctrine notes that "rogue
states" might have the resources to develop WMD and may disseminate or de-
ploy them because they "display no regard for international law... and callously
violate international treaties to which they are a party."'20 2 This is a far-reaching
stretch for contemporary international law. Let us further examine this.
A. Formulating the Doctrine: WMD and Non-WMD Threats
There are two separate issues that must be distinguished in the formulation
of the doctrine and its relationship to international law. The first is simply the
threat of terrorism absent the threat of WMD. 20 3 The restraints international law
197. H.A. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 20 (1950).
198. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15.
199. September 11, 2001 brought aircraft hijacking-a particularly horrific form of terrorism-
to the forefront of concern for American travelers and metropolitan workers. Lately, the government
has been dealing with the problem of allowing general aviation to fly under visual rules and "permit-
ting light aircraft and helicopters over cities, requiring a reconsideration of the damage these aircraft
could do as prepared suicide vehicles against 'soft targets' such as concentrations of people at sports
stadiums, concerts, or political events." See Phillip A. Karber, Re-Constructing Global Aviation in
an Era of the Civil Aircraft as a Weapon of Destruction, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 781, 805
(2002). Another disastrous form of terrorism is that perpetrated over the Internet, which threatens
soft targets associated with day-to-day business, economic, and social communications and transac-
tions. See William Gravell, Briefing to the Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference, Information War-
fare and Terrorism: Changing the Rules, San Antonio, TX (Aug. 19, 1997).
200. The United States has known for over a decade that increased security at hard targets has
shifted terrorists' attention to soft targets. In 1990, 75% of all terrorist attacks worldwide were
perpetrated against tourist spots, businesses, and other nonofficial targets. UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1990, 37 (1991).
201. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15.
202. Id. at 14.
203. On September 17, 2002, President Bush expanded his administration's approach to the
dangers posed by all terrorists, including those with and those without access to WMD. Specifically,
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imposes on the Bush Doctrine regarding such a threat would be, at a minimum,
whether preemptive action-which cannot meet an objective criterion of immi-
nence because of the nature of the terrorist threat-can still meet an objective
standard of reasonableness reconcilable with the fundamental right to self-de-
fense under Article 51 of the Charter, or evolving customary international
law. 20 4 Such action runs the risk of attempting to justify standardless interven-
tions, unguided by principles of international law and the trade-off between the
war against terror and unilateral action might be seen as an especially dangerous
strategy of action.2 ° 5 It is therefore imperative that international lawyers care-
fully articulate the standards that might justify a preemptive intervention; it is
additionally essential that the procedures for reporting interventions to the Se-
curity Council be fully employed so that such standards of justification may be
clearly established within the framework of the Security Council's mandate of
primary responsibility over matters of international peace and security. 20 6 Even
if a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda poses a threat to the security of
another state, that threat must be based on credible intelligence that can subse-
quently be made available to the Security Council subject to the reporting re-
quirements of Article 51.207
Situations involving possible access to or deployment of WMD by terrorist
groups seem to change considerably the legal calculus. It is therefore vitally
important that when the Bush administration acted on the rogue state principle in
attacking Iraq, it based its strategic analysis and self-defense justifications on
Iraq's control of WMD, as well as on the possibility that Iraq might distribute
those WMD to terrorist groups with the capacity to attack the United States, the
United Kingdom, and other possible targets of opportunity.20 8 It is also possible
President Bush declared that "[his] immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global
reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use WMD or their
precursors." NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 6.
204. See ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, ARTICLE 51 IN THm CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A
COMMENTARY 675 (1995) (stating that "ft]here is no consensus in international legal doctrine over
the point in time from which measures of self-defense against an armed attack may be taken.").
205. Following his 2002 commencement speech at West Point, President Bush was met with
international criticism for the tone of his address, in which he implied that the United States has the
unique ability to make and enforce decisions, which-he implied-is a power unavailable to other
states. However, it is well established under international law that the United States is equal with all
other sovereign states before the law. Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter states that "[t]he Organization
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." See U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
para. 1. Consider also Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 500, 515 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984), who states that
States enjoy an equal juridical status under general international law ... [T]he basic
structure of international law [is] as a legal order of co-ordinated juxtaposed political
entities, as distinguished from a civitas maxima or a world State order ... General
international law does not accord hegemonic powers a privileged legal authority over
their spheres of political influence, whether in the form of a 'police power' or an
adjudicative authority.
206. States are obligated to inform the Security Council of whatever measures of self-defense
that state intends to exercise under Article 51. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
207. Id.
208. This approach manifests a departure from the traditional approach to armed conflict, which
turns on exactly when an armed attack begins, as articulated by the Caroline case. The Caroline
case permits the use of defensive force when the "[niecessity of that self-defense is instant, over-
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that a threat posed by the combined existence of terrorism and WMD may re-
quire decision-making innovations on the part of the Security Council, if the
principle of collective responsibility is to be preserved.2 °9 Perhaps the Security
Council could create an institutional mechanism of intelligence cooperation, at
least among the five permanent members, with full participation by a representa-
tive of the Secretary General.2 1° Other States Parties might also have roles in
this process, as appropriate to their specific security concerns. 2 1' Additionally,
the Security Council might want to examine the development of enhanced intel-
ligence capabilities, so that the U.N. may more effectively protect its own
personnel.
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 29 British & Foreign
State Papers 1129, 1138 (1840-41) (quoting Daniel Webster, concerning the Caroline incident).
209. According to the Charter, the Security Council is explicitly responsible for rectifying inter-
national threats to the peace in the interest of maintaining collective security. See U.N. CHARTER art.
39.
210. Although the Security Council has primary responsibility for collective security in the
international system, its powers and efficacy are not unproblematic. The practical strength of the
institution of the Security Council is that the five permanent members wield important factual pow-
ers in the international system, and thus, wield important influence over security matters on a world-
wide basis. When the P-5 has a consensus, collective security initiatives will maximize the efficacy
of intervention. The practical problem of the Security Council is that each permanent member has a
veto. This means that a single permanent member can block effective Security Council collective
action by the threat of a veto or the actual exercise of it. This problem was partly resolved when the
General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution. This resolution was most unusual and
could, with hindsight, be understood as an organic modification or change in the U.N. Charter man-
dated by the principle of necessity. Action taken under these powers was heavily controverted,
although the ICJ in an Advisory Opinion, The Expenses Case, upheld the constitutional validity of
the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Since the composition of the General Assembly does not provide
majoritarian support for any particular member of the Security Council's permanent block, there is
obviously a reluctance to use the General Assembly process as a super-Security Council in emer-
gency situations when the Council's action is terminated by a veto. The veto by permanent members
is a power that was more universally institutionalized in the League of Nations, and in particular, in
the principle that League decisions required unanimity; by voting no, any sovereign party could
exercise veto power. This was, of course, a central reason that the League was a failure in matters of
international peace and security. The issue arose indirectly in the context of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia. In effect, the new states victimized by Serbian aggression were also limited in
their capacity to defend themselves by U.N. arms embargo. Thus, states could not effectively defend
themselves against ethnic cleansing and genocide, partly because a lifting of the arms embargo
would have to be done only if assurance could be had that no permanent member of the Security
Council would exercise the veto. This put the U.N. in an extremely difficult situation. In some
degree, the issues of the murkiness of the landscape regarding the scope of possible war crimes,
including crimes against the peace, remains problematic. See generally Winston P. Nagan, Rethink-
ing Bosnia and Herzegovina's Right of Self-Defence: A Comment, 52 INT'L COMM. JUts. 34 (1994);
see also HENKIN, supra note 69, at 69 (stating, "it is important that Charter norms-which go to the
heart of international order and implicate war and peace in the nuclear age-be clear, sharp, and
comprehensive.").
211. The events of September II therefore require us to be sensitive to the problem of the veto,
the downside of which may provide a spur and justification for the unilateral use of force and for a
possible abuse of the doctrine of preemption, unconstrained by any objective standards of reasona-
bleness. It is possible that the nature of the new threats to international peace and security will
require important constitutional changes in the structure and the processes of the Security Council.
For a review of some arguments regarding the possible reformulation of the Security Council and P-
5 veto power, see generally Craig Hammer, Reforming the U.N. Security Council: Open Letter to
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261 (2002).
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Facts implicating WMD would significantly change the criteria of what
might count as a reasonable invocation of preemptive self-defense, which could
theoretically stretch the meaning of "imminence" to suggest possible extinc-
tion.2 12 One might look at the rules governing the regime of nuclear weapons
and conclude, as Judge Weeramantry did, that they should be declared unlawful
per se. 2 13 Paradoxically, this argument might provide the strongest justification
for the Bush Doctrine's rising policy of preemptive strikes against rogue states
that have or might have the capacity to make, disseminate, and possibly use
WMD. If, for example, nuclear weapons are per se unlawful, then the possible
development and use of them by a state may well strengthen the characterization
that such a state is both a rogue state and a candidate for preemptive action.
2 14
Of course, this line of argument glosses over the fact that many states that have
WMD are not rogue states, and seemingly fall under the protection of rules that
prohibit intervention into their internal affairs. The rogue state argument might
then suggest that such a state must meet some criterion of "rogueness" that car-
ries an international law justification, which must have existed without regard to
its status as a state posing a WMD threat.215 It is possible that Iraq was a prime
candidate for this kind of analysis in the sense that its "rogueness" was tied to its
aggression against Kuwait and the Iraqi regime's reluctant tolerance or, perhaps
its uncooperative attitude toward the U.N. inspection regime. We should note,
however, that in the shifting justifications for the attack against Iraq, it was the
concern for the threat of WMD that seemed to be the strongest.216 To date, the
invading forces have not found these weapons.21 7 It is possible that they are
simply looking for the wrong things. With the almost decade-long inspections
regime, it is hardly likely that the Iraqi regime would have kept the recipe for
producing WMD inside Iraq in some logical place accessible to inspectors or to
invading forces. There can be no doubt that the Hussein regime clearly had an
incentive and a policy to produce WMD.2 18 Israel had them; this posed a re-
212. Sir Humphrey Waldock asserted that "[w]here there is convincing evidence not merely of
threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be
said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the frontier." See Humphrey M. Waldock, The
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEu_ DES COURS
451, 498 (1952).
213. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 226.
As Judge Weeramantry found, "humanitarian law reveals ... an abundance of rules which both
individually and collectively render the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons illegal." Id. at 496.
214. See Waldock, supra note 212, at 498.
215. See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in In-
ternational Law and International Relations (forthcoming 2004, COLUMBIA J. TRAN. L.). Professor
Nagan delineates a typology of approximately thirteen forms of state. The categories are somewhat
overlapping, but they are meant to be descriptive rather than juristic. These typologies are: failed
states, anarchic states, genocidal states, homicidal states, thug controlled states, drug controlled
states, crime controlled states, terrorist states, authoritarian states, garrison or national security states,
totalitarian states, democratic rule of law states, and rogue states [this latter category is recognized in
the new Bush Doctrine].
216. Philip Shenon & David Stout, Rumsfeld Says Terrorists Will Use Weapons of Mass De-
struction, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002.
217. See generally Reynolds, supra note 178.
218. See, e.g., Is Preemption Necessary?, WASH. Q., Spring 2003, at 115.
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gional threat to most Arab states, which is why Egypt's position after 1973 was
to move ahead with a peace treaty with Israel.219
Although this is not officially acknowledged in the Camp David Accords,
Egypt's position on the prospect of peace in the Middle East was influenced by
the fact that Israel had WMD. Indeed, Egypt has had a long-standing policy of
promoting the idea that the Middle East should be a nuclear-free zone.220 It was
one of the prime movers in the promulgation of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which
made Africa a nuclear-free zone. 22 ' The Hussein regime took an alternative
course, namely, to seek to match Israeli WMD developments with its own. The
Iraq regime then became Israel's critical state security threat in the region.222
Indeed, a symmetrical balance of WMD in the Middle East runs into the
political problem that the checks and balances in a totalitarian state are not the
same as those in a democratic state and thus, the symmetry and deterrence value
of the threat of mutual destruction is largely illusory. Israel's bombing of Iraqi
nuclear reactors was an example of a stretched version of anticipatory self-de-
fense, based on an expanded reading of the concept of an imminent threat.
Israel's idea of imminence was redefined by the nature of the threat, namely,
Iraq's scientific progress in the direction of the possible production of WMD.22 3
Consequently, so long as the Hussein regime had the desire, resources, and tech-
nical capability to produce and possibly deploy WMD, that regime would pose a
serious threat to the security of the Israeli state. Strategic planners would also
have to consider the possibility that WMD could be deployed outside the bound-
aries of conventional state defensive or offensive posture; they could be passed
on to terrorist groups, thus allowing rogue states to avoid detection and responsi-
bility for the possible use of such weapons. In short, a rogue-type regime could
disseminate WMD to terrorist groups on an anonymous basis, and thus insulate
itself both from responsibility and the prospect of retaliation. Introducing the
219. The world reached the brink of nuclear war approximately thirty years ago. The Yom
Kippur war quietly commenced when Egypt and Syria perpetrated a surprise attack against Israel;
the Egyptian Army crossed the Suez Canal and scores of Syrian tanks deeply infiltrated the Golan
Heights. Israel was caught entirely unprepared, and launched confused, unsuccessful counterattacks
until the early hours of October 9, 1973, when senior Israeli military leaders suggested that Israel
deploy nuclear weapons. Then Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected this course of action and instead
lobbied the United States for support. Soon thereafter, Henry Kissinger arranged air supply to Israel,
which turned the tide of the conflict. The Israelis crossed the Suez Canal, were within 20 miles of
Damascus, and encircled the Egyptian Army by October 21. Days later, the countries established a
permanent cease-fire. See Avner Cohen, The Last Nuclear Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at
A17. For a comprehensive review of the political history of Israel's nuclear program, see generally
AVNER COHEN, ISRAEL AND TE BOMB (1998).
220. For a discussion regarding the development of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of
the Middle East, see G.A. Res. 3263, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 27,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter Resolution 3263].
221. See Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), supra note
135.
222. In 1981 Israel claimed it acted in self-defense when it bombed an inactive Iraqi nuclear
reactor, arguing that Iraq was going to use the reactor to make nuclear weapons to threaten Israel.
See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
159 (1996).
223. Id.
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terrorism element into such strategic and operational concerns tests the founda-
tions of the self-defense principle as it is traditionally understood.2 24
If a regime is not reluctant to use WMD, it will be perceived as a greater
and more realistic threat than a state that has them, but has never used them.
The use of chemical weapons in Hallabja, a Kurdish populated city in Kurdistan,
signaled to the world community the possibility that the Hussein regime might
be unrestrained about its willingness to use chemical weapons in circumstances
that cannot be justified by international law.2 25 Most human rights groups
would have characterized the use of chemical weapons to exterminate the Kurd-
ish population of Hallabja as a human rights atrocity226 and, at least, as an inter-
national crime under the Genocide Convention, since the manifest targeting of a
specific group carried the Hussein regime's intent to destroy it in whole or in
part.
227
International lawyers must work more carefully through the specific prob-
lem posed by the Bush administration concerning the conditions now linked to
the major forms of armed conflict, which threaten individual and collective se-
curity. We would submit that a central principle implicit in the Bush Doctrine is
that when the reasons for a rule change, the rule must accordingly change.22 8
224. "[Ilt is the attack that provides the decisive test" as to when self-defense can be exercised.
Id. at 165.
225. Under Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, northern-dwelling Kurds constituted 23 to 27% of
population of Iraq. See Howard Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, 4
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 4, 5-7 (1992). Conflict between Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Kurds has been ongoing
for decades. For example, a Kurdish revolt against Saddam Hussein's Baa'th regime transpired in
1974 after a 1970 autonomy agreement between Iraqi Kurds and the Baa'th regime fell apart. Sad-
dam Hussein crushed this rebellion in 1975 when his forces killed 50,000 Kurds. Id. Later, after the
Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the Iraqi army killed thousands of Kurdish nationalists and used chemi-
cal weapons against the civilian population of the Kurdish village of Hallabja. Id.
226. A report by Max Van der Stoel, special United Nations investigator, tells of arbitrary
executions of individuals, families, entire Kurdish villages, and of arbitrary arrests and horrific tor-
ture, such as beatings, rapes, electric shocks, burning, and teeth and nail extractions. See Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 48th Sess., Agenda Item
12, at 12-30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/31 (1992); see also Jonathan C. Randal, Iraqi Files Point to
Mass Deaths, WASH. PosT, Feb. 22, 1992, at Al.
227. According to Article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948, acts of genocide are certain
acts "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such." See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
228. For example, President Bush intimated in his March 2002 speech in O'Fallon, Missouri
that international terrorism has changed the reasons underlying the rules level of armed conflict.
Specifically, with regard to fighting the war on terrorist acts perpetrated by al Qaeda operatives
under the protection of the Taliban regime during the war in Afghanistan, President Bush declared:
[Y]ou've got to know that we're fighting against Taliban determined group of killers.
These are people who would rather die than surrender. These are people who hate
America. They hate our freedom. They hate our freedom to worship. They hate our
freedom to vote. They hate our freedom of the press. They hate our freedom to say
what you want to say. They can't stand what we stand for. And, therefore, we have
no choice but to hunt 'em down one by one to defend the very freedom we hold dear
in America.
President George W. Bush, Speech in O'Fallon, Missouri, March 18, 2002, in Bush Vows to Con-
tinue Fight Against Terrorism, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/
0319bush.htm. President Bush apparently argues that the nature of the attacks of September 11,
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This principle works on the assumption that rules are responses to problems in
society generated by certain conditions. When the conditions change, it might
be possible to salvage the general basis of the rule, which might continue to
serve a purpose; it would thus be necessary for interpreters to decipher new
meanings that might be ascribed to the rules, but they must be developed with
far greater exactitude than the formulations as they currently appear in the new
Bush Doctrine. The idea that terrorists are non-risk-averse, have access to sig-
nificant resources, and could have access to WMD provides a small margin for
error on the part of both states and the Security Council in seeking to maintain
international peace and security. If a mistake is made, the consequences of the
use of WMD would be catastrophic, and one suspects that the freedoms we now
enjoy would be even more significantly diminished as a political matter.2 29 This
means that we must ever more carefully scrutinize background facts and intelli-
gence communiqu6s, as they become available, and cautiously monitor conflict
situations in ways that have not yet been done to ensure that the balance between
security and liberty is not destroyed. This balance is crucial to the foundations
of the rule of law as we currently understand it.
B. Rogue States
Against this background we come to precise issues implicit in the claims
asserted by the new Bush Doctrine. Two important principles merit analysis.
First, the doctrine observes the concept and expectation of what constitutes a
rogue state; second, the doctrine acknowledges that regime change may be justi-
fied by international law when states meet the "rogueness" criterion. According
to the Bush Doctrine, there are five characteristics which determine rogue state
status. They are states that:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal
gain of the rulers;
display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously
violate international treaties to which they are party;
are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other ad-
vanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the
aggressive designs of these regimes;
sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which its
stands.
230
The drafters of the rogue state definition might, of course, have had a spe-
cific regime in mind when drafting these criteria. However, it seems that these
drafters stumbled upon one of the most important, but nonetheless difficult,
2001 was extreme enough to change the face of the Caroline doctrine's established meaning of self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
229. In the aftermath of September 11, there was some concern that attempts to preempt future
attacks may trump democratic freedoms and liberties. See 148 Cong. Rec. S8646 (2002) (expressing
understanding for the desire to curb terrorism but fearing that the Bush administration, or any other
administration, "might become so zealous and so focused on that mission that important freedoms
could be trampled.").
230. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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questions of when a state is subject to international jurisdiction based on interna-
tional concern. What, in short, is the scope of an international obligation under
the U.N. Charter to limit the concept of sovereignty?2 3 ' The distinction made
by the Charter is that certain matters are reserved to the domestic jurisdiction of
a state. The implication is that sovereignty is divisible; some facets of sover-
eignty cannot trump the concept of international obligation and some preserve
sovereign autonomy over matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
a state. The five criteria listed by the Bush Doctrine involve factors that are
clearly within the purview of international jurisdiction because they are specifi-
cally, individually, and collectively matters of international concern. Generally,
this outlook might be surprising since the Bush administration's approach to
matters of international obligation has been littered with claims to U.S. excep-
tionalism,2 32 or what others have called U.S. unilateralism. 233 If the Bush Doc-
trine seeks to hold sovereign regimes in the international community to its
emerging standard of adherence to international obligations, soon, the United
States may not be able to pick and choose which rogue states to coddle and
which to destroy.
If one eliminates the "rogue state" language of the Bush Doctrine and sim-
ply examines criteria indicative of unacceptable international behavior under the
U.N. Charter, the concept of a "rogue state" is not normatively exceptional. In-
deed, it gravitates to a position long held by liberals and progressives in the
international community that U.N. Charter values must infuse the authority
foundations of the state. In short, the rogue state criteria are essentially the same
criteria normatively unacceptable for admission to U.N. membership. 234 Liberal
231. The Security Council has lately taken a far more interactive approach to the existence of
threats to international peace, which suggests that once they are generally notified, member states
have an obligation to rectify these threats under the auspices of the Charter. Between 1990 and
1996, the Security Council declared the existence of a formal threat to international peace and secur-
ity sixty-one times, as opposed to the six times it did so in the preceding forty-five years. Jessica T.
Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50, 59.
232. Historically, "exceptionalism" has been a staple of American foreign policy since Alexis
de Tocqueville published his observations of American society over one hundred-fifty years ago,
which has since evolved into American unilateralism. "Tocqueville is the first to refer to the United
States as exceptional-that is, qualitatively different from all other countries." SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 18 (1996). Among the various as-
pects of American culture with which Tocqueville was fascinated, he was particularly struck by the
individualistic nature associated with America's international relationships. See id. at 33 for Sey-
mour Martin Lipset's views, which are representative of a contemporary proponent of the "America
as unique" thesis.
233. See Michael J. Glennon, There's a Point to Going it Alone: Unilateralism Has Often
Served Us Well, WASH. POST., Aug. 12, 2001, at B2 (explaining the phenomenon of U.S.
unilateralism).
234. From a historical standpoint, liberals have long had a deep-seated mistrust of an-
tidemocratic processes, which stemmed largely from scores of eighteenth-century liberals skeptical
of the prevailing covert diplomacy and clandestine alliance politics, which they felt compelled states
to go to war. See FELIX GILBERT, THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 45-47, 60-62
(1961). World War I confirmed the fears of the successive generation of liberals, which paved the
way for President Woodrow Wilson to call for "[olpen covenants of peace openly arrived at" and the
development of the League of Nations. See President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress, Point
I of the Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918), reprinted in RUTH CRANSTON, THE STORY OF WOODROW
WILSON 461 (1945). The liberal solution to international enmity has hence been collective security
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international lawyers have long supported humanitarian intervention when
threats to international peace and security-based on the same criteria indicated
by President Bush-are threatened. The rogue state principle has other interest-
ing ramifications. It perhaps highlights the lacuna in the international system
which, traditionally, bases the recognition of a state on such practical criteria as
control over territory, population, internal governance, and the capacity to man-
age foreign relations. 235 Modem international law has sought to base the recog-
nition of a state as a member of the U.N. on its ability and willingness to uphold
the values of the U.N. Charter, in particular the values related to peace and
security. The rogue state principle seems to dramatically move the conception
of what comprises an acceptable sovereign state in the direction of the explicit
standards, policies, and purposes behind the U.N. Charter. If the United States
sought to define the concept of a rogue state in unilateral terms, the unilateral
invocation of critical U.N. Charter standards is an endorsement rather than a
depreciation of the Charter as an organizing principle of sovereignty and world
order.2 36 We do not believe that this is what the Bush Doctrine intended, but
this may be an unintended consequence.
There is a further insight that we might draw from the new Bush Doctrine.
We have mentioned that international law contains traditional criteria for the
identification of a state as well as those additional normative criteria discernable
from the U.N. Charter. Additionally, the recognition of the new states in the
Balkans has imposed even more strenuous criteria on the recognition of sover-
eignty by demanding that these new states' constitutions must be democratic,
safeguard human rights, and secure the protection of minorities.2 37 Where, then,
does the Bush Doctrine lead us? We would suggest that the rogue state concept
implies that decision-makers must now take a far more discriminating look at
by targeting the act of aggression itself, as opposed to a particular aggressor, thus subordinating
national interests to the interests of the global community. See MICHAEL SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT
FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER 54-59 (1986) (discussing liberal theories and ideas underlying the con-
cept of the League of Nations). The iteration of liberal ideology which followed emerged during and
after World War II; the belief in a new order based not on "exclusive alliances" but on "an all-
embracing vision of One World at peace" was heralded by the growing liberal societal base in
America. See M. DONELAN, THE IDEAS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 23-24 (1963). Con-
temporarily, these liberal views are entirely comprised by the chief instrument of international peace,
the United Nations, the Charter of which specifies that only defensive wars are legitimate. See U.N.
CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to suppress "acts
of aggression or other breaches of the peace"); id. art. 2, para. 4 ("All members shall refrain ... from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."); id.
art. 42 (permitting the Security Council to employ force "to maintain or restore international peace
and security"); id. arts. 43, 45 (obligating member states to provide forces to the Security Council);
id. art. 51 (preserving the right of individual or collective self-defense).
235. According to the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations section 201, "a state is an entity
that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and
that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." RE.
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 201 (1987).
236. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
237. See WARREN ZIMMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS DESTROY-
ERS-AMERICA'S LAST AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY xii (1996).
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the nature of a state and the trimmings of sovereignty within which it is clothed.
There are more discriminating criteria to distinguish states than simply size.2 38
There is a third and final element in this aspect of the analysis. In 1998,
Congress enacted legislation that encouraged the United States to work toward
the replacement of the Hussein regime in Iraq.2 39 A group of neo-conservative
politicians led by such figures as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz produced a
study that suggested that the then-existing circumstances in Iraq compelled the
United States to embark on a policy of regime change. 240 This policy was sub-
mitted to the Clinton administration, although to our knowledge the Clinton ad-
ministration did not act on it. Several of the same neo-conservative intellectuals
were also in the business of advising Benjamin Netanyahu concerning Israel's
security interests and the future. 24 1 The document they produced implied a
quite valid criticism of U.S. government policy in the Middle East.242 If it was
238. See Nagan, supra note 210. For example, there are entities which meet the requirements
of traditional international law but which may still be regarded as essentially failed states (including
drug-controlled states, cleptocratic states, thug-controlled states,and terrorist states) as well as au-
thoritarian states, totalitarian states, garrison states, and the related national security states in addition
to democratic states. It thus would seem that the Bush administration is claiming that the interna-
tional community must be more discriminating about what the content of state and sovereignty really
are. This, of course, means that the formal theory of sovereignty may now be more carefully scruti-
nized to determine whether, from the Bush Doctrine point of view, sovereignty serves a as mask for
a rogue state or, from an international point of view, whether sovereignty obscures certain realities
which are clearly matters of international jurisdiction.
239. Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law on October
31, 1998. Iraq Liberation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151),
which requires the United States to support military force to replace Saddam Hussein's regime.
240. In 1992, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz supervised the draft-
ing of the Defense Policy Guidance document, in which Wolfowitz made clear his objections to
what he considered to be the premature end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the Defense Planning
Guidance document, he outlined plans for military intervention in Iraq as a required action to ensure
"access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil" and to prevent proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and threats from terrorism. The document further called for preemptive attacks and
ad hoc coalitions, but explicitly states that the United States should be ready to act alone in the event
that "collective action cannot be orchestrated." See Joseph Cirincione, Origins of Regime Change in
Iraq, 6 PROLIFERATION BRIEF, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mar. 19, 2003, availa-
ble at http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p=8&PublicationlD=1214.
For greater detail on the Defense Planning Guidance document, see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. &
Thomas-Durell Young, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 7-8, 37-38 (Sept. 1, 1995), available at http://www.carlisle.
army.millssi/pubs/1995/nexus/nexus.pdf. When the Defense Planning Guidance document was
leaked to the New York Times, its terms proved to be so extreme that much of the document had to
be rewritten. See Patrick Tyler, U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop, N.Y.
TILES, Mar. 8, 1992, at A6. See generally Bill Keller, The Sunshine Warrior, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 22, 2002, at 48.
241. In 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser, collaborated on a report to the
newly elected Likud government in Israel. In this report, they called for "a clean break" with the
Israeli policy of negotiating with Palestinians and trading land for peace. They wrote that "Israel can
shape its strategic environment . . . by weakening, containing and even rolling back Syria. This
effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq ... Iraq's future could affect the
strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly." Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political
Studies, A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, at http://www.why-war.com I
resources/files /cleanbreak.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003). The report additionally called for "rees-
tablishing the principle of preemption." Id.
242. Several of the drafters of this document served as advisors to the Foreign Minister of the
Israeli government, Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party. Their charge was to freshly reexamine
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the U.S. policy to preserve the status quo, then U.S. policy would fail because
the status quo was committed to armed conflict and, from the Arab side, dedi-
cated to the possible extinction of Israel. Since most of these Arab states are
undemocratic and unaccountable, creating peace with them would essentially be
a tactical or strategic expedient to postpone conflicts indefinitely, not end them.
Theorists then realized the potential of a regime change in Iraq, which could be
the lever to completely shift the paradigm of Middle East conflicts. The strate-
gic implications were essentially these: if Iraq's Hussein regime could be over-
thrown and a democratic regime could be instituted with a strong American
military and intelligence presence, this presence could influence regime change
in Iran, where the Ayatollahs are known to be unpopular, in Syria, which runs
on undemocratic Baa'thist lines, and it could exert tremendous pressure on
Saudi Arabia to adapt.
The assumption made by the neo-conservatives was that the promotion of
democracy and the empowerment of civil society would dramatically shift the
paradigm of conflict in the Middle East. We suspect that these assumptions
were based on the notion that certain kinds of states are most reluctant to wage
war; these kinds of states often have vested interests in making peace and devel-
oping their societies by progressive means. This builds on the oft-cited dictum
that democracies tend not to make war on each other. This suggests a further
principle, which implies a claim that the preferred form of sovereign indepen-
dence is tied to democratic values, and that democratic values are themselves
critical for the establishment of enduring peace. It is not altogether clear in the
aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Iraq that this indeed is the scenario
that is being played out. In our judgment, if this is an accurate estimation of the
strategic objectives of the current administration, then one must admit that it was
a vastly ambitious and incredibly risky exercise. The critical question is: Can
war be justified simply to promote democracy?
The new Bush Doctrine must not be read simplistically; its creators might
have thought they were erecting a narrow construct to justify unilateral interven-
tion. The Bush Doctrine has also established an ostensible, yet elementary,
framework with regard to international relations and practice, which over time
may generate expectations about the permissible limits of what is and is not
the situation in the Middle East and to devise new strategies to possibly implement a new paradigm.
The document they produced was a highly sophisticated interpretation of the crisis in the Middle
East. Effectively, they collectively indicate that U.S. policy in general seeks stability in the Middle
East by developing short-term understandings with regimes which are largely undemocratic, unac-
countable, ruthless with regard to their own people, and unyielding in their covert support for inter-
national terrorism. Implicit in this formulation is the empirical assumption that in general,
democracies are not aggressive and do not coddle terrorism. Therefore, bold thinking required the
unthinkable; Arab states would have to contemplate regime change in a democratic direction and, if
that proved possible, the foundations for long-term peace in the Middle East would be assured.
Implicit in this approach is the idea that real sovereignty must be based on democratic principles and
that sovereignty based on absolutism can often mean a threat to international peace and security.
This approach seems to contain the incipient seeds of the Bush Doctrine with regard to rogue states,
abuse of sovereignty, and the stratagem of regime change.
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lawful.243 The Bush Doctrine, in fact, seems to promote the ideas of aggressive
international obligation, rethinking of state responsibility, and virtually and im-
plicitly asserts that democracy is a critical normative standard for maintaining
peace and security in the world community.244 These values have not always
been characteristic of U.S. foreign relations. Statements of principle do not ex-
haust the analysis of the lawfulness of certain conduct under international law.
The methods, techniques, strategies, and tactics to secure a state's objectives
must still be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny to determine if they meet at
least a standard of reasonableness; if these doctrines do manifest reasonable re-
straint in their assertion of claims in the international system, they must addi-
tionally justify them.
VII.
STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE IRAQ WAR
Let us backtrack a bit. Israel basically has a monopoly on WMD in the
Middle East. It developed nuclear capability because it apparently felt that ulti-
mately, nuclear deterrence was and is the only way to guarantee its continued
existence. There is evidence that during the 1973 war, the Israeli Cabinet con-
sidered using nuclear weapons to defend itself if it became necessary. 245
Clearly, Egypt would have been one of the target states for a nuclear attack. It is
therefore not surprising that the Egyptians seriously examined the nuclear threat;
Egypt soon opted to become a nuclear-free state, committed to abolish nuclear
weapons in both the Middle East and Africa.246 We suspect that this Egyptian
policy was induced by the facts that Israel had nuclear weapons and a territorial
rearrangement could not be achieved through the use of force. The Egyptians
had an incentive at Camp David to make peace. The Israelis also had an incen-
tive to make peace, particularly with an Arab state working so aggressively to
rid the Middle East and Africa of nuclear weapons. Iraq, however, had a differ-
ent point of view. Clearly, Israeli nuclear weapons constituted a threat to Iraq
and from Iraq's point of view, there needed to be a symmetrical rather than an
asymmetrical balance of power in the Middle East. Thus, Iraq's effort to de-
velop WMD enhanced the security threat in the region, and partly explains why
Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad on the morning of June 7,
1981.247
243. With all interventions comes the possibility of setting dangerous precedents. See Nigel S.
Rodley, Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal
Framework, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS 31 (Nigel S. Rodley ed., 1992).
244. Peacebuilding is a problematic element in the new Bush Doctrine because of the confusion
surrounding the concept itself. The Bush administration argues that the only way to secure a lasting
peace in Iraq (with implications for the rest of the Middle East) is to establish democratic institu-
tions. For a review of this long-standing idea, see Pauline H. Baker, Conflict Resolution Versus
Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF
AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICr 563-72 (1996).
245. See COHEN, supra note 219.
246. See generally Resolution 3263, supra note 220.
247. See W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981,
Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417
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Legal justifications do not exhaust a rational inquiry into whether the use of
force is permissible. Broader contextual factors might serve to enhance or
lighten the weight of proffered justifications. Indeed, strategic justifications
may have an influence on what is and is not permissible or reasonable in the
context of states' international relations. Strategic justifications may undermine
the claim that certain forms of conduct are lawful, while they might support
other claims to lawfulness. The critical question, then, is what strategic calcula-
tions animated the Bush administration to press for an attack on Iraq in the face
of Security Council opposition, which itself created a global crisis of confidence
in either the prudence of U.S. foreign policy or in the relevance of the U.N. as an
institution for moderating conflicts and developing peaceful structures of global
importance? We recall that the central argument articulated by the Bush admin-
istration was that Iraq was in breach of its obligation to disarm. 24 8 If this were
all, the justification for going to war-upholding the U.N.'s inspection regime-
seems weak if the inspection regime itself had not completed its work and if the
U.N. reposed faith in the fact that the regime could complete its work. This left
the administration to offer a second justification, that Iraq was a rogue state with
WMD and was therefore a threat to international peace and security. A preemp-
tive attack with regime replacement to follow would be justified. As we have
seen, the latter is a more serious claim that must be examined from a strategic
point of view.
2 4 9
A single nuclear power in the Middle East-or a state with other WMD
capabilities-constitutes a major security threat for all states and peoples in the
region and two WMD powers immeasurably enhance the instability of the re-
gion. From the Israeli point of view, WMD in the hands of a contiguous dictator
is a long-term and vital security threat. Under such circumstances, the Israeli
authorities would have a vital interest in seeing preemptive action in Iraq and
possibly even regime change. Likewise, the U.S. Congress also saw the threat
posed by Iraq and enacted legislation calling for the replacement of the Saddam
Hussein regime.25 °
VIII.
WHETHER THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ UNDERMINE
THE NEW BUSH DOCTRINE
These strategic implications must still meet the test of whether the methods
used to secure regime change can be justified under international law. This re-
calls the standards that govern the imperative to intervene under whatever con-
(1982); see also The Israeli Air Strike: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-88 (1981).
248. See Julia Preston & Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Moves to Persuade Security Council to Con-
front Iraq on Arms Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at A6.
249. For example, if there were a reason to believe that the Hussein regime had WMD, then the
enemies of this regime might be justified in feeling vulnerable if the regime could deploy these
weapons to terrorist groups bent on mass murder.
250. See generally Iraq Liberation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2151).
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struction we give to the principle of self-defense in international law. Here, the
asserted strategic justifications for regime change, which suggest a course of
action to replace a dictator with a regime of democratic aspiration on the
grounds of humanitarian intervention 25' or based on this dictator's potential to
produce WMD in the future, must confront additional facts which suggest other
motives for intervention. These other motives might include the possibility that
a war in Iraq would be popular in the United States through the lens of U.S.
domestic politics. 252 The actual invasion of Iraq also coincided with the Enron
scandal.2 53 Enron, with its major Texas connections, was a corporation close to
the President's political pocketbook.2 54 An invasion of Iraq would also be rela-
tively low cost, but its enormous oil resources would constitute a win-win scena-
rio for American corporate interests, as well as the Iraqi exiles who would
replace Saddam's elite ruling autocracy. The oil interest scenario implicated
Afghanistan as well, since Unocal, an operation with ties to the Republican
Party, pressed the U.S. government to negotiate with the Taliban on the oil pipe-
line through Afghanistan. What is clear is that economic interests tied to big oil
represent self-interested pressure, and such pressure would seem to undermine
the case that self-defense, preemptive self-defense, and regime change were
matters mandated by reasonable standards in international law.
One further point might be made with regard to these contextual factors;
the invasion of Iraq would also subject the United Nations to the dictates of the
United States, or perhaps demonstrate that the United Nations is, in fact, irrele-
vant. These factors might detract from the idea that the Hussein regime repre-
sented the kind of threat which mandated an armed intervention. In the context
of Iraq's reconstruction, the Bush administration seems to have a continuing
policy of unilateralism. The administration has expressed evident reluctance to
expand the U.N. role in nation-building, and reluctance to bring other nation-
251. Note that Saddam Hussein ran what we describe as a homicidal state. See Nagan & Ham-
mer, supra note 215.
252. Among the U.S. domestic interests that might be protected by the war in Iraq include
continuing the war on terror, especially against Al Qaeda, and continuing the search for weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq. See Dana Milbank, Bush's Oratory Helps Maintain Support for War:
Skillful Rhetoric Keeps Public on Board Despite Mounting Casualties, MSNBC NEWS, at http://
msnbc.msn.com/id/4825552/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
253. During the 107th congressional session, Congress was preoccupied with the Enron Scandal
and with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; accordingly, a series of congressional resolu-
tions were sponsored, which dealt with homeland security, corporate accountability, and, perhaps
most importantly, the authorization of force against Iraq (just prior to bankruptcy reform). See Ses-
sion Headed For Another Week; Endgame In Doubt, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 10, 2002.
254. See Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1 (stating that "[bly the time Mr. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001,
Enron and a number of its executives, including Mr. Lay, had contributed more money to Mr. Bush
over his political career than anyone else, an amount exceeding $550,000. Enron then wrote a check
for $100,000 for Mr. Bush's inaugural committee, and Mr. Lay added another $100,000."); Joseph
Kahn & Jeff Gerth, Collapse May Reshape the Battlefield of Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2001, at C1 (reporting that Kenneth Lay met with Vice-President Cheney for thirty minutes to dis-
cuss the Bush administration's new national energy policy, which included Enron's long-standing
goal of breaking up monopoly control of electricity transmission networks, and that "Enron also had
an unusual opportunity to influence Mr. Bush's choices" for appointments to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)).
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states under the umbrella of the U.N., even though this could ease the burden on
Americans in human lives and the economic cost of the occupation. The pres-
ence of private industry, such as Halliburton, which has received billions in pay-
ment for reconstructing Iraq, also seems to suggest a level of self-interestedness
that undermines the ostensible goals and objectives indicated in the Bush
Doctrine. 2
55
Overthrowing the Hussein regime in Iraq was only the second pillar to fall
in the plan to redesign the entire region. However, strategically, it is a crucial
pillar. The Hussein regime was an international delinquent that institutionalized
brutalization and torture and even used WMD on its own inhabitants. It was
also a regime rich in human and material resources. Disposing of Hussein
would give the U.S. interests control over Iraq's oil, which would essentially
permit Iraq to pay for the replacement of its own regime.2 5 6 As indicated ear-
lier, a critical U.S. presence in Iraq could then be effectively used to destabilize
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria since all of these regimes are widely acknowl-
edged to be unpopular, corrupt, and thoroughly undemocratic.2 57 The Iraq War
was a bold strategic design; had the original plan worked, it is likely that some
Middle-eastern nations would have praised President Bush's efforts. However,
the Bush administration stalled on Saudi Arabia, apparently because of the ex-
tensive ties between the Bushes and the royal family.2 5 8 With Saudi Arabia off
255. Iraq, apparently, is officially for sale; in September 2003, the U.S.-appointed administra-
tion in Iraq announced it was opening up nearly all segments of the Iraqi economy to foreign inves-
tors. By this time, the U.S./Iraqi Administration and the Iraqi Governing Council, which was hand-
picked by U.S. occupying forces, already awarded reconstruction contracts to U.S. firms, including
Bechtel and Halliburton, but offered their competitors no opportunity to bid on these projects and
recently announced actions to allow foreign ownership of "any of Iraq's assets, apart from its oil."
See Charles Hodson, Iraq Opens up to Global Investors, CNN NEWS, Sept. 22, 2003, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ WORLD/meast/09/21/iraq.dubai/. This includes everything from
pharmaceuticals and engineering to electricity and telecommunications, which could mean that hun-
dreds of previously state-owned companies would be sold off at fire-sale prices. Id.
256. The United States might employ the same compensation scheme as the United Nations
Compensation Commission (UNCC) applied after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Specifically, the
United Nations Security Council determined that the UNCC would retain 30% of Iraq's oil revenues
to pay for the operating costs of the UNCC, according to U.N. Resolution 687. See Resolution 687,
supra note 165. In May 1991, the U.N. Secretary-General anticipated that Iraq's oil revenues for
1993 would amount to $21 billion, of which the UNCC would be entitled to $ 6 billion. See William
E. Huth, The Iraq Claims Tribunal: An Overview of the U.N. Compensation Commission, 54 Disp.
RESOL. J., May 1999, at 25, 83.
257. Richard Murphy, a former Assistant Secretary of State to the Reagan administration, con-
tends that Iran's longstanding problems stem from its inherently corrupt and mismanaged govern-
ment. See Richard W. Murphy, It's Time to Reconsider the Shunning of Iran, WASH. POST, July 20,
1997, at C . With regard to Saudi Arabian corruption and anti-democratic governance, see generally
Kathy Evans, Fundamental Difficulties, GUARDIAN, May 15, 1993, at 27.
258. See Lally Weymouth, How Bush Went to War, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1991, at B1. At the
advent of the Persian Gulf War, under President H.W. Bush, Secretary Dick Cheney was sent to
discuss the U.S.-Saudi relationship with Prince Fahd of the Saudi royal family; A Bush administra-
tion official said, "there was a conclusion that we needed to put a defensive posture into Saudi
Arabia to let Saddam know that an attack against Saudi Arabia was an attack against the U.S."
Professor Michael Glennon has written that President H.W. Bush's pledge to Saudi Arabia was
"made as a sole executive agreement ... more sweeping in its terms than any of the seven mutual
security treaties to which the United States is party, for none of those contains an ironclad commit-
ment to go to war." See Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 FOREIGN AFF.
[Vol. 22:375
HeinOnline  -- 22 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 436 2004
2004] THE NEW BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE
the radar screen and the problems of consolidating the victory in Iraq looming
large, the metaphor that the United States hooked the big Iraqi fish, forcing
others to quickly fall into the net, was reversed. Now, the United States appears
to be on the hook and terrorist operatives in the region have not ceased.
Meanwhile, the cost of U.S. unilateralism under the Bush Doctrine has in-
creased exponentially in terms of the human cost as well as the material
price.259 Most recently, President Bush addressed the United Nations, issuing a
call for U.N. support in the peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.26 °
Bush's call was mandated by the problematic situation of security on the ground
and the difficulty of reconstructing the basic infrastructure of Iraq. The human
costs have become a serious political problem for the President; the economic
costs are such that it is imperative that outside states be willing to make impor-
tant contributions to Iraqi reconstruction.
Unfortunately, in light of his September 23, 2003 speech to the United Na-
tions, it is now evident that the President does not concede the relevance of the
United Nations in these matters. 26 1 Neither has the President actually seen how
84, 85 (1991); see also Bush: No Appeasement: U.S. Role in Saudi Arabia is 'Wholly Defensive,
America Will Stand by Her Friends,' President Declares, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990 at P1.
259. Speaking on the war in Iraq, Senator Ted Kennedy said the Bush administration has failed
to account for nearly half of the $4 billion the war is costing each month. He said he believes much
of the unaccounted-for money "is being used to bribe foreign leaders to send in troops." Kennedy
Remarks, supra note 177.
260. Specifically, President Bush stated that
[Tihe United Nations can contribute greatly to the cause of Iraq self-government.
America is working with friends and allies. . .[to] expand the U.N.'s role in
Iraq... [and] the United Nations should assist in developing a constitution, in training
civil servants, and conducting free and fair elections [in Iraq] .... The United States is
[also] using sanctions against governments to discourage human trafficking. The vic-
tims of [the human trafficking] industry also need help from members of the United
Nations .... [These challenges] require urgent attention and moral clarity. Helping
Afghanistan and Iraq to succeed as free nations in a transformed region, cutting off
the avenues of proliferation, abolishing modem forms of slavery-these are the kinds
of great tasks for which the United Nations was founded.
See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General
Assembly, (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0920030
923-4.html.
261. In his September 23, 2003 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President
Bush admonished the Assembly that "careful discussion ...and also decisive action [is needed
regarding Iraq]." See id. His subsequent remarks insinuated that the United States has assumed the
responsibility of following through on the principles of the U.N. Charter; accordingly, he seems to
suggest that if the United Nations does not take action in situations that-in the estimation of U.S.
government officials-demand action, then the United States shall act instead. Specifically, Presi-
dent Bush stated that
[The United States was] an original signer of the U.N. Charter... [a]nd we show that
commitment by working to fulfill the U.N.'s stated purposes, and give meaning to its
ideals. The founding documents of the United Nations and the founding documents
of America stand in the same tradition. Both assert that human beings should never be
reduced to objects of power or commerce, because their dignity is inherent. Both
require-both recognize-a moral law that stands above men and nations, which
must be defended and enforced by men and nations.
These remarks seem to harmonize with the President's earlier remarks to the United Nations General
Assembly of September 12, 2002, in which he questioned the relevance of the United Nations.
Specifically, President Bush stated that "the United Nations [faces] a difficult and defining moment.
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important it is to secure United Nations approval as a means to collaborate with
other states. It is also possible that the credibility of the United States, in seek-
ing to deal unilaterally with global terrorism, has compromised the delicate
structures of the diplomatic process for forging complex alliances under interna-
tional law. U.S. exceptionalism, and the trend toward unilateralism, will require
a sea change in the administration's perspectives on multilateralism and its sup-
port for the integrity of U.N. institutions and processes. The ultimate challenge
is not simply a challenge to the viability of the United Nations or to conven-
tional international law principles, the challenge is fundamentally to the vital
importance of the international rule of law itself.
Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence?
Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?" See President
George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releasesl 2002/09/20020912-l.html. This position has been reit-
erated by various members of President Bush's administration. See Statement by U.S. Ambassador
John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov. 8, 2002) (stating that if the United Nations
Security Council "failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation, [Resolution 1441]
did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by that
country, or to ... protect world peace and security.").
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